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The Global Diffusion of the Internet Project was initiated in 1997 to study
the diffusion and absorption of the Internet to, and within, many diverse
countries. This research has resulted in an ongoing series of reports and
articles that have developed an analytic framework for evaluating the
Internet within countries and applied it to more than 25 countries. (See
http://mosaic.unomaha.edu/gdi.html for links to some of these reports and
articles.)
The current report applies the analytic framework to compare and
contrast the Internet experiences of Turkey and Pakistan, through mid-
2000. Although historically these countries have not been closely related,
there are significant parallels between the two that make them well suited
for a comparative study of the absorption of the Internet. Turkey and
Pakistan are among the largest non-Arab Muslim countries in the world.
In contrast to most of their Arab counterparts, their governments were
founded as secular, parliamentary democracies. Both countries have had
stormy political histories, however, with periodic coups and authoritarian
governments. Each country has firmly entrenched bureaucracies with closed
and, to varying degrees, corrupt processes.
Their economies have been similarly troubled, with periods of rela-
tive hopefulness punctuated by stagnation and decline. Both countries
have suffered from erratic growth rates, high inflation, and high deficits.
For most of their histories, their economies were rather closed and autarkic.
In recent decades, each country has taken substantial steps to move
toward a more open, market-oriented economy and made expansion of
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the telecommunications infrastructure a high priority. Each country has
sought, less successfully than had been hoped, to attract foreign invest-
ment and integrate itself more fully with the global economy.
Each country has a number of national security concerns. Turkey and
Pakistan both have histories of serious domestic terrorism and persistent
conflict with a non-Muslim neighbor.
In spite of the macro-similarities, there are numerous differences be-
tween the two countries. Pakistan is considerably poorer and less devel-
oped than Turkey; it has had more coups and assassinations, deeper eco-
nomic troughs, greater heterogeneity within its population, and more en-
demic corruption.
The Internet in Turkey
The first international Internet connection from Turkey (to the U.S. Na-
tional Science Foundation) was established In 1993. In 1996, Türk
Telekom, the national telecommunications services provider, granted a
contract for the creation of a national Internet backbone to the GlobalOne
consortium. This backbone, TURNET, went online during the fall of 1996
and provided the foundation for private, commercial Internet service pro-
viders (ISPs).
The creation of TURNET and a competitive ISP market led to a dra-
matic expansion of Internet usage in Turkey. During the first two years of
TURNET operation the number of ISPs increased by 600 percent. Be-
tween 1996 and 1999, the number of Internet users in Turkey grew by
approximately 800 percent, reaching over 1 percent of the population by
1999. The rollout of an ATM network called TTNet in 1999–2000 has
dramatically increased domestic and international bandwidth capacity and
supported continued expansion of the Internet. In 2000, 3–4 percent of
Turkish citizens were Internet users.
The Internet in Pakistan
The first international Internet service in Pakistan was launched by Digicom
in 1995. The licensing of commercial Internet service providers began in
1996. By mid-1999 licenses to provide Internet services had been issued
to approximately 100 organizations, of which approximately 40 were
offering service. By mid-2000, the number of Pakistani users had grown
to 500,000–700,000, or nearly 0.5 percent of the population.
Unlike Turkey, Pakistan lacks a proper Internet backbone. Each ISP
leases lines for both domestic and international connections. Only in 2000
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were developments underway to create a network access point (NAP) at
which Pakistani ISPs could exchange traffic. Without such NAPs, traffic
from one domestic ISP to another has to travel outside the country and
back.
Similarities and Differences
The dramatic growth in the Internet user population in both countries has
been fueled in part by a highly competitive and expanding community of
Internet service providers that have been increasing access, reducing prices,
and promoting content attractive to local and expatriate communities.
The ISPs, in turn, have benefited from long-term efforts to expand and
improve the telecommunications infrastructure as well as periodic price
reductions by the national telecommunications providers. Internet use in
the health, education, government, and, especially, commercial sectors
has grown significantly, although not uniformly.
Turkey and Pakistan share other, less positive features. The vast ma-
jority of citizens are still without Internet access. Only in 1999 did Internet
penetration reach 1 percent of the population in Turkey; Pakistan may
not cross this threshold until the year 2001. For most, the cost and diffi-
culty of accessing the Internet are prohibitive. Neither country has been
able to develop infrastructure fast enough to accommodate growing de-
mand. The domestic and international infrastructures are often saturated.
In spite of these similarities, the two countries have significant differ-
ences. Turkey’s per capita usage of the Internet is over six times that of
Pakistan. While Turkey has been rolling out its second-generation na-
tional backbone, Pakistan is still talking about developing its first. While
the Internet is accessible from nearly every Turkish village, access in Paki-
stan is limited to major urban areas. Many major Turkish corporations
are embracing the Internet and its new business models. Such activity is
much less widespread in Pakistan.
While many factors play a role in shaping the Internet within coun-
tries, the analysis of Turkey and Pakistan suggests three factors that play
particularly important roles: the state of the overall economy, the state of
the telecommunications infrastructure, and the often complicated trian-
gular relationship between the government, the telecommunications ser-
vice provider(s), and the Internet service providers.
The state of the economy has a powerful impact on a number of key
factors, such as the affordability of services and the resources necessary to
expand infrastructure and promote innovative economic activity. Unfor-
tunately, this is one of the most difficult factors to improve. While neither
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country has a particularly strong economy, Pakistan’s economy lags
Turkey’s on all major indicators.
While both countries have invested substantially in expanding tele-
communications infrastructure, Turkey’s has far greater scope and pen-
etration than Pakistan’s. The quality and extent of Internet access within
a country depends directly on the basic telecommunications services avail-
able to users and ISPs.
While the state of the economy and telecommunications infrastruc-
ture set a basic landscape for the Internet, they do not help us understand
why the Internet “took off” in these two countries in a relatively short
period of time. One of the more interesting aspects of Internet evolution
that can help explain this phenomenon has been the relationship between
the government, the ISPs, and the telecommunications services providers.
While policy-makers as a whole in both countries have been rather
indifferent to the Internet, each country has had a number of policy-makers
(some with cabinet level rank) and interest groups that have been strong
proponents. In contrast, we have not observed any organized, significant
opposition to the Internet by interest groups in either country. A turning
point in both countries occurred when policy-makers permitted the cre-
ation of privately owned ISPs. Once Internet service became available at
affordable (for many) costs, the desire to socialize, be entertained, and
access information drew hundreds of thousands of individuals in both
countries into cyberspace.
The relationship between the ISPs and the telecommunications ser-
vice providers, on the other hand, strongly differentiates Turkey and Paki-
stan. While Türk Telekom was somewhat hostile toward ISPs in the early
days of the Turkish Internet, by 1996 it had positioned itself not as a
direct competitor of, but as a provider of infrastructure to these new com-
panies and their users. While the relationship has not been free of conflict,
it is, on the whole, rather supportive and mutually beneficial.
In contrast, the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited
(PTCL) and the Pakistani ISPs have had a much more confrontational
relationship. PTCL views the ISPs not so much as valued customers for
high-capacity services but as competitors of its own ISP, PakNet. At the
same time, to enhance its privatization prospects, PTCL has sought to
maintain its profit margins on basic services. It has dropped prices more
slowly than Türk Telekom and has not provided a national backbone the
way Türk Telekom has. While the competition with ISPs has caused PakNet
to improve its service and lower its prices, the hostile relationship be-
tween PTCL and the ISPs has hindered Internet growth overall.
While there are countries that have taken strong measures to counter
the perceived negative effects and threats of the Internet, Turkey and Paki-
xiv
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stan are not among them. In both countries, the positive perceptions of
the Internet as an enabler of economic development and integration have
dominated policy-making in this area. The beneficiaries of Internet growth,
the ISPs and the commercial interests that are gaining from information
dissemination and electronic commerce–related investment and transac-
tions, are increasingly exercising lobbying power to promote support of
the Internet. At this point, the window of opportunity for a concerted
opposition to dramatically curtail the spread of the Internet is closing.
Each country’s government has a range of measures that can be taken
to promote the Internet. Some of these are relatively easy: dropping rates
for domestic and international connectivity, promoting legislation estab-
lishing a proper framework for electronic commerce, and continuing to
invest in infrastructure. Somewhat more difficult are the expansion of IT
education and the promotion of a competitive environment for all com-
munications services, including basic ones.
The future of the Internet in both countries is promising. Whether
and how quickly the Internet will reach its potential and keep pace with
other countries, however, depends strongly on measures taken by the gov-
ernments and the national telecommunications service providers to re-
move limiting factors.
xv
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11. Introduction
In 1969, the experimental ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network) being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense consisted
of four host computers all located in the United States. England and Nor-
way were added in the early 1970s. In 1980, 213 host computers in less
than a half dozen North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries
were connected. By 1989, only a few years after the ARPANET migrated
out of the Department of Defense and became the Internet, connectivity
jumped to more than 20 countries and 100,000 host computers.
During the 1990s, annual worldwide growth of both hosts and users
was often in the neighborhood of 100 percent, and much higher in some
countries. The millionth host was connected in 1992. Today there are
over 200 countries with full TCP/IP connectivity, approaching 350 mil-
lion users.
The spread of the Internet arguably has been one of the most rapid
and extensive diffusions of advanced technology in history. Given its present
and potential technological features and uses, it was inevitable that the
Internet itself, or as a surrogate for similar wide-area networks, would
become the object and locus of a great deal of attention, speculation, and
conflict. Furthermore, the forms and extent of the absorption of the Internet
are viewed by some as a barometer for a nation’s level of freedom and
democracy, its commercial energy, its desire to become part of the increas-
ingly interconnected new world order and its empowerment therein, and
its vulnerabilities.
The Internet has become fertile ground for commentators and vision-
aries with vivid imaginations. It will do much to bring about world peace
and harmony, or it will greatly expand global commerce, or it will be the
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2locus of forms of information warfare from which nobody who is any-
body can be safe, or it will bring about the end of the sovereign state. All
this, and much more, is said to be here or on the way via the Internet.
But so far little of this has happened. The Internet is still far less wide-
spread than the telephone or television or radio. It is in fact less widespread,
in spite of some awesome growth rates, than many people assume or be-
lieve. Its spread and use have been very nonuniform. Much of what there
is in many countries is concentrated in one or at most a very small number
of major cities, although this is starting to change.
The goals of the Global Diffusion of the Internet Project are:
1. To provide an analytic framework for describing the diffusion and
absorption of the Internet to, and within, many diverse countries.
The framework should capture a rich set of details that goes well
beyond simply counting hosts, yet still be practical and useful.
2. To provide some explanation of how the Internet’s present state came
about and how it is evolving.
The unit of analysis is the nation-state, and particular attention is
being given to policy issues and government roles that arise with regard to
the spread and control of the Internet around the world. So far, the Internet
is hardly making the nation-state obsolete, but is in fact the source of
many additional agenda items for governments to consider.
The project is proceeding by developing a framework for analysis in
parallel with an inductive study of a fair number of countries and regions.
The two efforts are intended to be complementary: The analytic frame-
work is used for each new country or regional study, and each new coun-
try or regional study is used to further test and refine the framework.
The first major report of the project, entitled An Initial Inductive
Study, was completed in March of 1998.1 An initial framework was pre-
sented, based on one that was developed for national studies over a wider
set of information technology topics.2 A set of variables was defined that
provided a six-dimensional description of the status of the Internet in a
country, and that could also conveniently represent how this status changed
over time. Each variable is intended to describe an important, measurable
feature of Internet presence in a country. The six variables chosen were:
per capita pervasiveness, geographic dispersion, sectoral absorption, con-
nectivity infrastructure, organizational infrastructure, and sophistication
of use. A more loosely defined set of determinants was also put forward
with the intent of using these to explain how the national Internet status
came to be and how and why it is changing. Since 1998, the project has
produced a number of single-country and multicountry studies employ-
ing this analytic framework (see http://mosaic.unomaha.edu/gdi.html).
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contrast the Internet experiences of two countries, Turkey and Pakistan,
through mid-2000. Although historically these countries have not been
closely related, there are significant parallels between the two that make
them well suited for a comparative study of the absorption of the Internet.
Turkey and Pakistan are among the largest non-Arab Muslim countries in
the world. In contrast to most of their Arab counterparts, their govern-
ments were founded as secular, parliamentary democracies. Both coun-
tries have had stormy political histories, however, with periodic coups
and authoritarian governments. Each country has firmly entrenched bu-
reaucracies with closed and, to varying degrees, corrupt processes.
Their economies have been similarly troubled, with periods of rela-
tive hopefulness punctuated by stagnation and decline. Both countries
have suffered from erratic growth rates, high inflation, and high deficits.
For most of their histories, their economies were rather closed and autarkic.
In recent decades, each country has taken substantial steps to move
toward a more open, market-oriented economy. Each continues to carry
out extensive privatization campaigns, both to generate revenue for the
central treasury and to invigorate segments of the economy. In these ef-
forts, results have been mixed. In particular, both countries have long
tried to privatize their national telecommunications service providers, but
only recently have they come close to reaching this objective. Both Turkey
and Pakistan have placed a high priority on the expansion of the tele-
phone system, and while by some metrics (e.g., number of main lines per
100 population) Turkey (24 percent) is ahead of Pakistan (2 percent),
both countries have made sizable investments in this area and have seen
their telecommunications infrastructures grow considerably. Each coun-
try has sought, less successfully than had been hoped, to attract foreign
investment and integrate itself more fully with the global economy.
Turkey and Pakistan also share a history of serious domestic terror-
ism as well as persistent conflict with a non-Muslim neighbor, although
Pakistan’s conflicts with India have burned considerably hotter than have
Turkey’s with Greece.
In spite of the macro-similarities, there are numerous differences be-
tween the two countries. Pakistan is considerably poorer and less devel-
oped than Turkey, and it has had more coups and assassinations, deeper
economic troughs, greater heterogeneity within its population, and more
endemic corruption.
The combination of similarities and differences makes the two countries
well suited for a comparative analysis of the Internet. Like the countries
more generally, the Internet experiences of the two have similarities and
differences that, when analyzed in the context of a broader understanding
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4of the countries and the factors shaping Internet development, shed light
on the reasons why the Internet evolves as it does and can lead us closer to
an understanding of the Internet throughout the world.
Chapter 2 provides a description of an analytic framework for study-
ing the global diffusion of the Internet. Chapters 3 and 4 present the devel-
opment and absorption of the Internet in Turkey and Pakistan, describing
its state in terms of the analytic framework’s six dimensions.
Chapter 5 presents a comparative analysis of the determinants of
Internet diffusion. This chapter offers the most detailed insight into the
similarities and differences between Turkey and Pakistan in the factors
shaping the Internet’s evolution.
Chapter 6, the conclusion, highlights some of the key similarities and
differences and concludes with a discussion of measures Turkish and Paki-
stani policy-makers might take to further promote the Internet in their
countries.
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52. The Analytic Framework
Most broadly, the framework used in this study consists of dimensions
and determinants. The dimensions are six variables that capture the sta-
tus of the Internet within a country at a given point in time. Evaluations
of dimensions at intervals over time are used for longitudinal studies. Evalu-
ations of dimensions for different countries at the same point in time can
support comparisons between countries. Both are used in the current com-
parison of the Turkish and Pakistani Internets. Determinants reflect those
factors that led to the current conditions and will likely influence future
development.
What to measure is not as obvious or well established as in other
areas, such as telephony. In developing the current framework, researchers
tried to balance the needs of theoretical richness with the practical ap-
plication. A useful analytic framework should be sufficiently rich that it
captures well the multifaceted diversity of countries’ experiences with
the Internet. At the same time, the number of variables should be small
enough that they can be easily kept in mind. Each of the variables should
describe an important, somewhat intuitive, and measurable feature of
the presence of the Internet in a country. In a rough sense, the variables
should form a complete set in that they collectively cover almost every-
thing that might reasonably be of interest, and each variable should have
something to offer to the overall picture that the others do not. Finally,
for the framework to be useful, it must be feasible to measure the values
of the variables given a modest investment of resources. If the analytic
framework is based on variables that cannot be measured in practice,
then its effectiveness is compromised.
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6Framework Dimensions
The six dimensions of Internet diffusion are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Dimensions of the Diffusion of the Internet
Of the six dimensions, three answer the question, “How much?” The
final three reflect structural variables: Connectivity infrastructure repre-
sents the degree to which users can effectively communicate via the Internet
and the number and speed of a country’s international connections. Orga-
nizational infrastructure describes the richness and robustness of the
Internet service provision market and hence the potential for further pro-
liferation. It also is the dimension that most directly reflects one of the
most important variables in Internet diffusion, government policy. The
final dimension, sophistication of use, represents the degree to which the
technology has really caught hold within a country and become a part of
that country’s social, economic, and management fabric.
Pervasiveness
Pervasiveness is a function principally of the number of subscribers and
hosts per capita. It differs from commonly used Internet growth metrics
only in that the final measure of pervasiveness is not an absolute number
but a ranking of that number in one of five levels. The intent is to depict
the fraction of a population that uses the Internet regularly. Such numbers
are not readily available. However, it is often possible to obtain or reason-
ably estimate the number of subscribers, that is, Internet account holders.
The actual number of users is usually larger by amounts that vary greatly
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7Table 2 illustrates distinctive features, common to all dimensions, of
the levels. The levels should progress from less to more in an ordered way.
Using an order of magnitude difference between levels has a number of
advantages. First, it increases the probability that two observers looking
at the same country at the same point in time are likely to come up with
the same assignments of levels, in spite of the fact that data about the
Internet is often rapidly changing, incomplete, and of variable credibility.
Second, while the measure is fundamentally quantitative, there is a quali-
tative aspect to the levels. When a country progresses from one level to
another, the change is substantial enough that one is likely to observe a
significant change in the impact and use of the Internet on a country.
















Geographic dispersion describes the physical dispersion of the Internet
within a country, there being benefits to having multiple points of pres-
ence (POPs), redundant transmission paths, and multiple international
access points. Many countries are also subdivided ethnically by geogra-
phy. High geographic dispersion is a requirement for the Internet to trans-
form the country as a whole and not just a few isolated cities. It often
implies less “digital divide” between rich and poor, between urban and
rural citizens. Table 3 illustrates the levels of geographic dispersion.
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Sectoral absorption recognizes the differing impacts of the degrees to which
four major potential Internet-using sectors of society have taken up the
technology: the academic, commercial, health, and public (government)
sectors. While the sectors describe the major social and economic divi-
sions in society, none is homogeneous, as depicted in Table 4. Personal
use is not considered in this metric.
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9Internet use within each sector is rated as rare, moderate, or com-
mon, according to the guidelines in Table 5. To rate the country as a
whole, each sector with a Minimal rating is assigned one point, each Me-
dium sector two points, and each Great Majority rating three points. If a
sector has no Internet presence, it receives zero points. Table 6 translates
the points to levels of sectoral absorption.
Table 6. The Sectoral Absorption of the Internet
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Connectivity Infrastructure
Connectivity infrastructure comprises four components: the aggregate
bandwidth of the domestic backbone(s), the aggregate bandwidth of the
international IP links, the number and type of interconnection exchanges,
and the type and sophistication of local access methods being used. Table
7 depicts how these factors are related to the assessment of the
infrastructure’s level of development, with Level 0 assigned to a country
with no Internet presence (and hence, no infrastructure) and Level 4 as-
signed to a country with a robust domestic infrastructure, multiple high-
speed international links, many bilateral (“peering”) and open Internet
exchanges—facilities where two or more IP networks exchange traffic—
and a variety of access methods in use.
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Just as the connectivity infrastructure assessed the extent and robust-
ness of the physical structure of the network, organizational infrastruc-
ture, derived from the number of ISPs and the competitive environ-
ment, assesses the robustness of the market and services themselves
(see Table 8).
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Sophistication of Use
To understand the Internet capability of a country, it is necessary to under-
stand not only how many and where people use the services, but also how the
Internet is employed. Of particular interest is the point reached when the
Internet attracts interest and use outside a narrow community of technicians.
A second major milestone is reached when the user community transitions
from only using the Internet to creating new applications, sometimes eventu-
ally having an impact on the Internet elsewhere. Table 9 depicts the develop-
ment stages that reflect an increasing sophistication in the use of the Internet.
Framework Determinants
While the “state” of the Internet at a given point in time within a given
country can be captured using the dimensions outlined above, it is perhaps






















Table 8. The Organizational Infrastructure of the Internet
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evolve to the state it has. Understanding these factors not only has explana-
tory utility but also can indicate the principal mechanisms, factors, and
policies that may be applied to promote (or hinder) the Internet’s develop-
ment. Figure 1 lists the collection of top-level factors that our research sug-
gests most strongly shape the nature and extent of the Internet within a
country. Government policies are identified separately as a determinant
because of their importance and because government policies impact the
dimensions only indirectly, by shaping other determinants. The arrows re-
flect the direction of causality between the independent variables (determi-
nants) and the dependent variables (dimensions) used in this study. This is
not to imply that other causalities do not exist. For example, government
policy-makers may formulate policies in part as a reaction to the state of
the Internet itself. Each of the determinants is a rather high-level variable
that may consist of a number of more specific variables. We provide a brief
description of each, followed by a more precise treatment of the relation-
ship between determinants and dimensions.
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Access to Constituent Technologies
Users must be able to access the Internet. Internet services must be avail-
able, and users must have access to the personal computers, modems, and
dial-up lines or networks by which to access them. Internet service pro-
viders must have access to the domestic and international circuits neces-
sary to connect to the global Internet.
Perceived Value
There must be a net perceived value to use of the Internet. Some of the
reasons perceived value may increase include communication, entertain-
ment, access to information (e.g., scientific, governmental, etc.), engaging
in activism to promote one’s agenda, or seeking profit. At the same time,
there may be reasons decreasing the perceived value, including objection
to social values promulgated on the Internet, the fear of electronic com-
munications, and violations of privacy. For the Internet to be widely used,
the net value of using the Internet must be positive for many people.
Individual organizations may view the Internet positively, as a source
of competitive advantage or opportunity, or as a threat to entrenched
interests, security, etc.
In any country many interest groups and stakeholders may have widely
differing views about the value of the Internet. Some may view a robust
Internet as beneficial to the country’s international image or economic
environment. Others may view it as a threat to national security, social
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Figure 1. Determinants of Internet Diffusion
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that can be calculated (in relative rather than absolute terms) as a func-
tion of the number and relative strength of the constituencies on either
side of the Internet development question. The nature of this balance of
tensions is likely to have a strong impact on policy-making, resource allo-
cation, etc.
Ease of Use
The Internet must be sufficiently easy to use. One of the developments
that sparked the explosion of the Internet in the United States was the
development of the web browser, which offered a single, integrated, point-
and-click interface to a wide variety of information sources. At the same
time, users must have the basic literacy necessary to boot up a computer,
start an application, and read the contents of a webpage. The Internet
may not be perceived as easy to use in countries where there is a dearth of
webpages in one’s native language, or where a large fraction of the popu-
lation lacks the ability to read or write.
Cost
The Internet must be accessible at an affordable cost. The cost to the end
user is a function of a number of upstream costs, including the rates and
terms charged by ISPs to end users, long-distance and local telephone
charges for dial-up access, the cost to the ISPs of domestic lines, and the
cost of international lines. Clearly, affordability is also a function of in-
come levels.
Adequacy and Fluidity of Resources
Resources fall into five broad categories: financial, informational, human,
technological or capital, and material. Material resources—raw materi-
als, energy—are usually not a major issue in the development of the Internet,
although there are countries whose power grids reach a limited percent-
age of the country, are unreliable, or both. Technological resources are, in
the case of the Internet, the hardware and software components that con-
stitute the infrastructure: routers, cables, switches, and so forth with the
software to make it function. The term human resources refers to the
quantity and quality of know-how necessary not only to install an infra-
structure but also to keep it operating over time. Informational resources
consist largely of the documentation relevant to all the tasks that are part
of building and maintaining an infrastructure. Financial resources may
often substitute for other resources. For example, granting contracts to
organizations with the wherewithal to carry out an infrastructure devel-
opment project may compensate for shortcomings in technology or know-
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how. Financial resources may come through government allocations, do-
mestic private investment, or foreign investment. Fluidity of resources re-
fers to the ease with which resources can flow from where they are to
where they are needed. For example, countries in which life-long loyalty
to one’s employer is common will have much less fluidity of human re-
sources than countries in which loyalty to one’s employer is not valued as
highly as personal advancement, wages, etc. Countries with well-developed
venture capital markets have much greater fluidity of financial resources
than those without such markets.
Regulatory and Legal Framework
All wide-area (interorganizational) networks require some sort of agreed-
upon regulatory arrangement if the many pieces are to function together.
In the case of the Internet, there must exist some provision for allocating
IP addresses and domain names in a systematic fashion. The regulatory
environment must allow, or at least tolerate, the existence of Internet ser-
vice provider organizations if Internet access is to be possible. Laws may
be passed regarding cyber crime, taxation, accounting, legal status of elec-
tronic signatures and documents, and so forth.
Ability to Execute
An abundance of resources and good intentions will not result in expan-
sion of the Internet if the organizations involved in the development of
the Internet do not have an ability to execute. The ability to execute re-
flects an ability to develop a sound strategy and a suitable design given
existing opportunities and constraints, and the ability to manage the plans
through to completion. The ability to execute may be compromised by
political infighting or instability, corruption, red tape, historical legacies
(e.g., existing but inadequate infrastructure or legacy hardware/software
systems), or simply a mismatch between the scope of the project and the
organization’s expertise.
Geography
Although the “virtual” quality of cyberspace is often touted, the Internet
infrastructure and the people who use it are ultimately grounded on the
earth. Countries with large landmass, widely distributed population cen-
ters, rough or hostile terrain, or a multitude of islands are likely to find it
more difficult to achieve good geographic coverage than small countries
free of geographic obstacles. The need to overcome difficult geographies
may drive countries to develop or apply new technologies as a means of
national integration.
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Demand for Capacity
While in some countries the determination of the capacity of the Internet
infrastructure may be divorced from the question of real and perceived
demand, in most countries existing and projected demand does influ-
ence decisions affecting the investment in and design of the Internet infra-
structure.
Culture of Entrepreneurship
The willingness and ability of individuals and organizations to pursue
activities related to the use or creation of the Internet and Internet services
are influenced by the overall culture of entrepreneurship and business cre-
ation that exists within a country. In countries where individual initiative
is highly valued and failure is not viewed as a serious blow to one’s honor
or professional career, one can expect to see a broad array of Internet
service providers.
Forces for Change
Forces for change are those factors that encourage or facilitate change
within a country. For example, a number of scholars have identified a
competitive environment as a particularly strong determinant of techno-
logical capability.3 The impetus for change can come from many quarters:
competitive forces, strong customer demands, a persuasive champion or
agent of change, the opportunity to pursue personal or collective objec-
tives, challenges that prevent the same, a cultural predisposition to change
(“change is good”) especially in the technical arenas, and mandates or
other imperatives such as defeat in war.4
Enablers of Change
When a force for change and a receptive user community exist, other
factors may influence the degree and nature of change. These factors may
be a part of the nation’s landscape: the national innovation system,5 the
existence of historical strengths (e.g., Israeli expertise in security issues),
the legal framework for creating new companies, and so forth.
Impact of Determinants on Dimensions
Table 10 indicates relationships between the determinants and the dimen-
sions. An X in a cell indicates that a particular determinant has a signifi-
cant impact on a particular dimension. The matrix is not exhaustive; one
can imagine some secondary impacts not shown in this matrix.
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Examining the X’s within a particular column can give some insight
into how growth in a particular dimension can be encouraged (or discour-
aged) through a manipulation of the associated determinants. For example,
pervasiveness is a function of access, perceived value, ease of use, and
cost. If any of these factors is highly unfavorable, then individuals will not
access the Internet, even if the other three factors are favorable. The pres-
ence of forces for and enablers of change will impact the rate of change of
Table 10. Internet Diffusion Dimensions and Determinants
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pervasiveness. At the same time, incremental increases in individual deter-
minants may have a positive impact on the dimension. For example, per-
vasiveness is likely to be improved by the following:
 • improving access to the constituent technologies (basic telephone ser-
vice, Internet services, personal computers, and modems)
 • enhancing the perceived value of the Internet (often a social phenom-
enon, but one that may be enhanced by providing desirable content
or making previously laborious tasks—e.g., banking—easier, cheaper,
or both)
 • making the Internet easier to use (e.g., by increasing local language
content or improving literacy rates)
 • reducing the cost of access (e.g., through lower ISP subscription rates,
reduced costs to ISPs by the telecommunications services providers,
etc.)
Correspondingly, pervasiveness can be hindered by making any of
these four conditions less favorable.
Government Policies
Government policy belongs in a category by itself, since it overlays all
other determinants, affecting both their nature and their effectiveness,
based upon a government’s ability to exercise coercive power. The poli-
cies created by a government are generally intended to achieve the ful-
fillment of that government’s goals, which may be more or less closely
related to the goals of those governed, depending upon the form of gov-
ernment. The government’s policies may also appear to be more or less
rational, depending upon how well the policy reflects the realities of its
milieu, but governments can—and all too often do—create policies that
reflect a lack of awareness or understanding of their environment or an
excessive optimism regarding the government’s ability to overcome ob-
stacles to its policies. The most important levers are:
 • passage of legislation and directives that shape the legal environment
within which a society functions
 • enforcement of laws and the wishes of those in control of security
forces
 • taxation, fees, and other forms of revenue generation
 • allocation of resources: financial, informational, technical, human,
and material
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Governments’ ability to apply the levers of power to shape determi-
nants is by no means uniform across determinants. Some determinants,
such as geography, are, for the most part, outside the realm of influence of
the government. Other determinants, for example resources and legal and
regulatory environment, lie firmly within the reach of governments’ levers
of power. Still other determinants lie somewhere in between. While gov-
ernments may over time work to create an entrepreneurial culture within
a country, for example, this is usually a slow and uncertain process.
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3. The Internet in Turkey
Introduction
For thousands of years, the land now part of the Republic of Turkey
(Figure 2) has been at the crossroads of major trends and forces of civi-
lization. Straddling the boundary between Europe and Asia both geo-
graphically and culturally, Turkey is a land of dramatic contrasts. While
98 percent of the population are Muslim, its government is a secular de-
mocracy with a parliamentary system similar to that of many European
countries. While its cultural roots are Middle Eastern, this NATO coun-
try is seeking membership into the European Union. The western portion
of the country, centered around Istanbul, offers a cosmopolitan, urban
life for over half of Turkey’s population. Most of the country’s geography,
however, consists of pastoral agricultural regions, barren wastelands, se-
rene coastlines, and harsh, mountainous regions.
History
Today’s Istanbul was established as Constantinople, the eastern capital of
the Roman Empire, in A.D. 324, nearly a thousand years after its found-
ing by Greek colonists. For almost a thousand years the city was the greatest
city in the western and near-eastern worlds. In its prime, this capital of
Byzantium boasted an order of magnitude greater population than the
next largest city in Europe, and its volume of trade probably exceeded all
of Europe put together.
The city fell into decline during the first centuries of the second mil-
lennium and was captured by Ottoman Turks in 1261. Over the next four
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hundred years, the Ottoman Empire expanded rapidly, reaching at its ze-
nith in 1600 as far east as Hungary and as far west as today’s Iraq.
The Ottoman Empire established a legacy of government dominance
of all aspects of the economy. Highly bureaucratic and protective of the
power of the sultan, the Ottoman Empire checked the emergence of a
class of hereditary nobility and managed the economy in minute detail.
Prices of all goods, shipping procedures, the quality of yogurt, the ingre-
dients used in making candles, and the hazard posed by chickens in flour
mills were all subject to government decree and regulation.6 Not surpris-
ingly, such detailed control had a stifling effect on innovation. The Otto-
man Empire’s contributions to the arts and the sciences were minimal.
The sense that the government should take care of all the needs of the
people was strong.
The Ottoman Empire declined from the late 17th century through the
start of the 20th century. Dragged into World War I on the side of the
Central Powers, the Ottoman State barely battled the Allies (which were
seeking to capture the Dardanelles) to a stalemate. Following the armi-
stice at Mudros in 1918, an Allied fleet began a military occupation of
Istanbul.
In May 1919, Greece landed an army in today’s Izmir to reestablish
Greek control over lands of classical civilization. Within days, Mustafa
Kemal, the country’s war hero, organized a nationalist resistance with
headquarters in Ankara. One of the first measures by the successful resis-
tance was to separate the temporal power from the religious power, ban-
ishing the sultanate and later the caliphate from the land.
The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 by Kemal, known as
Atatürk, the “Father of Turks.” Until his death in 1938, Atatürk intro-
duced a number of social, political, linguistic and economic reforms that
form the ideological basis for modern Turkey. Known as “Kemalism,” the
ideology integrates secularism, nationalism, and modernism and views
the West as a source of inspiration and support. During World War II,
Turkey fought on the side of the Allies. As part of an effort to stem Com-
munist expansion in the countries bordering the Turkish Straits, Turkey
joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.7
Politics
The Republic of Turkey has had a tempestuous political environment
that, while democratic, has been characterized by frequent periods of
instability and authoritarian rule. From 1923 through 1950, Turkey was
governed under one-party rule by the Republican People’s Party (CHP)
established by Atatürk. The Democratic Party ruled until 1960, when it
was overthrown by a military coup. A new constitution was written and
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civilian rule reinstated in 1961. Between 1961 and 1965 coalition govern-
ments ruled Turkey. In 1965 and 1969, the Justice Party (JP), led by the
president of Turkey, Suleyman Demirel, won sizable majorities in the Grand
National Assembly and ruled alone. Political agitation and violence by
left- and right-wing extremists in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to a
“coup by memorandum” in 1971. Demirel’s government resigned, and
for the following two years a succession of “above party” governments
ruled. Although the CHP emerged as the largest party under the leader-
ship of today’s prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, in the 1973 elections, Tur-
key was ruled by a succession of unstable coalitions from 1973 to 1980,
led alternately by Demirel and Ecevit.
By 1980, Turkey’s economy was in steep decline, and domestic politi-
cal violence was claiming 20 victims per day. The Council of National
Security (CNS) forcibly restored order on September 12, banning politi-
cal activity, dissolving political parties, capturing thousands of terrorists,
and confiscating large volumes of weapons and ammunition. The CNS
began work crafting an economic austerity program authored principally
by Turgut Ozal, deputy prime minister from 1980 to 1982.
A national referendum approved the current constitution on Novem-
ber 7, 1982, and simultaneously elected the leader of the CNS, General
Kenan Evren, to a seven-year term as president. In 1983, political parties
were once again permitted to form, provided that none of their leaders
had been leaders before 1980. In 1983, the Motherland Party (ANAP),
founded by Turgut Ozal, obtained a majority in the Grand National As-
sembly and began implementation of the austerity program. The 1980s
were a period of uncharacteristic political stability, as Ozal’s party main-
tained a comfortable majority in the Grand National Assembly until 1989.
Since the late 1980s, governments have changed frequently, including
a parliamentary crisis in 1995 and 1996 in which: the leading parties
(True Path Party under Tansu Çiller and the CHP under Deniz Baykal)
failed to form a coalition; a minority government under Çiller lost a no-
confidence vote; national elections gave nearly equal representation to
the True Path Party, the Motherland Party, and the emerging Islamic-
oriented Welfare Party (RP); and the mainstream True Path and Mother-
land parties failed to form a stable coalition. Recent developments have
not been much more hopeful. A July 25, 1999, headline summarized the
state of affairs: “Domestic Politics in Tatters.”8
Turkey continues to struggle with a number of internal and external
issues. Since the mid-1980s, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has been
trying to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey.
Terrorist attacks have been a prominent tool of the organization. In re-
cent years, the government has engaged in counterinsurgency operations
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that have reduced violence in the region’s urban areas and resulted in the
capture of leading PKK officials, including Abdullah Öcalan and Cevat
Soysal.
In 1974, Turkey sent troops to Cyprus to protect the Turkish Cypriot
community following the overthrow of the Cypriot government by main-
land Greek officers in the Cypriot national guard. In the fighting that
followed, Turkey occupied the northern part of the island, which is now
known as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The unresolved par-
titioning of the island remains a point of disturbance in Turkey’s relation-
ship with the United States and the European Union as well as with Greece.
Economy
In 1923, Atatürk established Turkey’s economy as one that was state-
directed, near autarkic, and oriented toward import substitution. The
economy remained based on these principles until the coup in 1980. In
this year the government began to implement an austerity program de-
signed by Turgut Ozal that was based on a philosophy of greater reliance
on market forces, decentralization, export-led development, lower taxes,
foreign investment, and privatization. These reforms brought Turkey sub-
stantial gains, with the gross national product (GNP) enjoying the highest
growth rate of any OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development) country.
During the 1990s, however, weak and uncertain governments and
strong entrenched interests prevented the country from following through
on many of the reforms initiated in the previous decade. The Turkish
government’s inability to limit expanding fiscal deficits and high transfers
to inefficient state economic enterprises led to an economic crisis in 1994.
From 1993 to 1994, the Turkish economy contracted by 11 percent.9 An
austerity program implemented in April 1994 helped the economy grow
in 1996 and 1997.
Turkey’s economy recovered somewhat during the latter half of the
1990s (see Table 11), although structural reform efforts have had only
partial success. The principal economic problem remains inflation, which
in 1998 was 75 percent annually. The government has failed to seriously
improve the efficiency of tax collection and the streamlining of the social
security system, both of which are necessary to relieve pressure on the
state budget.10
An area of recent success has been privatization. Although sales of
state economic enterprises have been below the targets set for the
privatization program, Turkey did sell $3.2 billion in public assets in the
first half of 1998, almost as much as in the years 1986–1997 combined.11
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One of the most important enterprises currently in the process of being
privatized is Türk Telekom, the state telecommunications company.
Geography and Demographics
The Republic of Turkey occupies over 780,000 square kilometers, slightly
more than the state of Texas. Over 60 percent of its population of 64.57
million (July 1998 estimate) live in urban areas.12 The population is over-
whelmingly Muslim (98.8 percent, mostly Sunni); 80 percent are ethni-
cally Turkish, while approximately 20 percent are Kurdish. The latter live
predominantly in the eastern portion of the country.
Turkey is divided between Europe and Asia. The small European por-
tion lies to the west of the straits that separate the two continents. The
Asian portion of Turkey consists of a large, dry Central Plateau that rises
to mountains in the east, many of which exceed 3,000 meters in height.
The East Black Sea Mountains lie along Turkey’s northern Black Sea coast.
To the south, the Taurus range parallels the Mediterranean Sea.
Population ............................ 64.57 million (July 1998 estimate)
Population growth rate ......... 1.6% (1998 est.)
GDP ..................................... $200 billion (1999 est.)
GDP per capita ..................... $3,200 (1999 est.)
Inflation rate ......................... 99% (consumer price index, per annum)
Telephones ........................... 14.3 million (1995 est.)
Teledensity ........................... 24.11 main telephone lines per 100
 inhabitants (1998)
Personal computers (PCs) ... 1.1 million (1997 est.)
PC density ............................ 1 PC per 56 individuals
Literacy rate ......................... 82.3% of  those age 15 and over
can read and write
Infant mortality ...................... 38.27 deaths per 1,000 live births
(1998 est.)
Sources: Bureau of European Affairs, Turkey: Background Notes (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, October 1999), <http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/turkey/
bnotes.html> (Oct. 14, 2000); ÒIncrease in Number of Cellular Phones in Turkey,Ó Istanbul
Hurriyet (January 22, 1999): 7; Ministry of Transport, The Current Situation and Trends in
the World: Sub-tasks, Executive Summary (Turkish National Information Infrastructure
Project [TUENA], January 1998); ÒTurkey: Recent Economic Developments and Selected
Issues,Ó IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/104 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary
Fund, 1998), <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/1998/cr98104.pdf>; U.S. Department
of Commerce, Turkey: World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: National Trade Data Bank, May
6, 1999), <http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/turkey/wofact.html> (June 23, 1999).
Table 11. Turkey in Statistics
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Turkey is divided into an unusually large number (80) of first-tier
administrative subdivisions, called provinces (iller).
Networks in Turkey
A Brief History of Telecommunications
Until 1994, the postal and telecommunications services were provided by
the Post, Telegraph, and Telephone (PTT) company, which was a state
economic enterprise under the control of the Ministry of Transport and
Telecommunications (MTT). In 1994, the parliament passed a law that
split the post and telecommunications functions, incorporating the tele-
communications division as Türk Telekom, a joint stock company whose
shares are 100 percent owned by the government. Türk Telekom holds a
monopoly on the provision of both domestic and international telecom-
munications lines and services.
The growth of networking in Turkey is closely associated with the ex-
pansion of telecommunications services, which began a rapid advance dur-
ing the 1980s. From the installation of the first telephone exchange in Turkey
in 1909 through 1980, telephone line density had grown to only approxi-
mately 2.5 lines per 100 inhabitants. There were nearly as many people
waiting for telephone lines as there were lines (1.5 million), yet the number
of lines was growing at the very modest rate of 50,000 lines per year. Over
72 percent of Turkey’s 40,000 villages had no telephone service.13
The austerity program crafted by Turgut Ozal and later implemented
by his administration during the 1980s placed a high value on expansion
of telecommunications services, which the program’s authors viewed as a
vital foundation to support the expanded and vibrant economy envisioned.
This emphasis on telecommunications was motivated from three princi-
pal quarters. First, the army, the second largest in NATO, demanded a
strong telecommunications infrastructure. Second, the open economy es-
poused by Ozal and others required a quality telecommunications infra-
structure. Third, during the early 1980s, the instability in Lebanon was
causing many companies to look for safer havens in the Middle East. The
lack of a good telecommunications infrastructure was a barrier to attract-
ing these companies.14
A master plan for telecommunications was drawn up, emphasizing
rapid expansion of the telecommunications network, development of new
services, and the cultivation of a competitive telecommunications envi-
ronment.15
The effects of the master plan and its implementation soon became
evident. Between 1982 and 1986, the total capacity of telephone exchanges
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increased by 83 percent. The number of telephone subscribers grew by 80
percent, and the number of villages having telephone service grew by 162
percent.16 By 1988, all Turkish villages had telephone service.
The growth of data networks has been driven by many of the same
factors that fueled the growth in telephone and broadcast communica-
tions networks. The economic policies crafted after the 1980 coup estab-
lished the importance of creating an infrastructure to support the flow of
information, both voice and data, throughout the economy. During this
decade Türk Telekom built or oversaw the development of the first switched
data network and the creation of TURPAK, an X.25 packet-switched net-
work.17 At the same time, Turkish universities were establishing a wide-
area network to support data communications among Turkish universi-
ties and academic institutions in Europe. In 1986, Turkish universities
established a BITNET (“Because It’s Time” Network) connection between
Ege University in Izmir and the European Academic and Research Net-
work (EARN) via Pisa, Italy, through a 9,600 bps leased line.18 The net-
work was named the Turkish Network of Universities and Research Insti-
tutes (TÜVAKA).
The Origin of the Turkish Internet
The first activities to establish an IP-based network started in 1989. The
group of network managers of TÜVAKA nodes first proposed such a net-
work instead of BITNET during an Istanbul meeting. In 1993, the Middle
East Technical University (METU) and Turkish Scientific and Technical
Research Council (TÜBITAK) established a dedicated 64 Kbps Internet
connection between METU and the U.S. National Science Foundation
(NSF) with funding from Turkey’s State Planning Organization. TÜBITAK
is the organization principally responsible for funding scientific and tech-
nical research in Turkey, analogous to the United States’ National Science
Foundation. Unlike the NSF, however, it has its own research centers. The
decision to connect to NSF rather than the Center for European Nuclear
Research (CERN) was based on traffic analysis of the EARN/BITNET
connection, which showed that about 80 percent of the traffic entering
Turkey came from the United States, and most of the international traffic
originating in Turkey also terminated in the United States. The connec-
tion with NSF marked the official birth of the Internet in Turkey. At the
same time, METU and TÜBITAK also formed an informal organization
known as TR-NET to promote the use of Internet technologies through-
out Turkey.19
Users and user organizations could connect to TR-NET through leased
lines, X.25 connections, and dial-up. In 1994, TÜBITAK and METU be-
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gan issuing accounts. The number of users grew rapidly. By early 1995,
the number of hosts had grown to nearly 3,000, and the total number of
daily users was estimated to be 10,000–15,000. Of these users, more than
1,300 had individual connections; others accessed TR-NET through more
than 100 connected institutions. Personal applications were being received
at the rate of about 200 per month.20 At these levels of usage, the interna-
tional link to NSF was saturated; it was later upgraded to 128 Kbps.
It was clear that the informal association between TÜBITAK and
METU was an insufficient foundation on which to build broader diffu-
sion of the Internet in Turkey. Although TR-NET was charging institu-
tions and individuals for their connections, these charges were low. Major
funding for TR-NET’s infrastructure came from the METU and TÜBITAK
annual budgets.
Until 1995, Türk Telekom had taken a rather relaxed attitude toward
the Internet, even though one might argue that the Internet represented a
new form of communications that should be under Türk Telekom’s juris-
diction. This attitude was in part a result of a lack of awareness on Türk
Telekom’s part of the significance of the Internet, and partly a function of
the embryonic, experimental nature of the networks in Turkey. When
TÜBITAK and METU approached Türk Telekom in 1995, however, the
company began to take a more serious interest in the Internet. Questions
were raised about the constitutionality of having organizations other than
Türk Telekom provide services; moreover, the previous 15 years of tele-
communications development had created a precedent of Türk Telekom
expanding services into emerging areas.
In promoting the Internet, Türk Telekom had to balance multiple fac-
tors. One requirement was that the backbone should be provided under
an arrangement that would preserve Türk Telekom’s mandate to be the
sole provider of communications services. At the same time, Türk Telekom
did not have in-house the resources or expertise to manage a large Internet
service provider operation to hundreds of thousands of end users. The
model that emerged was one in which Türk Telekom owned the back-
bone; end users would be served by service provider organizations that
would be required to connect to the backbone.
The prospects of finding the funds within its own budget to build a
backbone were almost nonexistent, however. Because it is a government
organization, Türk Telekom returns all of its annual revenue to the gov-
ernment. In turn, Türk Telekom receives an annual budget from the state
treasury, as outlined by the State Planning Organization. The company is
not permitted to borrow money or sell equity to finance investments as
private companies do.21 In 1995, the year following the introduction of a
government austerity program, the prospects of coaxing funding for what
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was still a technology virtually unknown to policy-makers, the press, and
the general population were vanishingly small.
Given the circumstances, Türk Telekom fell back on the only alterna-
tive model it knew for financing new development: revenue sharing. Under
a revenue-sharing model, Türk Telekom partners with an organization to
undertake a development project. The partner provides all of the invest-
ment capital and often a portion of the expertise. Türk Telekom and the
partner divide the revenue from the project in negotiated proportions.
The revenue portion Türk Telekom receives is very attractive because it
does not need to be passed along to the state treasury. Türk Telekom has
control over these funds and, for the most part, spends them as it wishes.
On September 28, 1995, Türk Telekom announced a tender for the
creation of an Internet backbone for Turkey. An auction followed in Oc-
tober and November, and the winner was announced at the annual Internet
conference on November 16 the same year.22 Initially, there were four
bidders:
1. MCI, partnering with Likom, a Turkish software company, and Nurol
2. IBM
3. ITD Laserex, an Israeli company
4. a consortium consisting of GlobalOne (the international consortium
between Sprint, Deutsche Telekom, and France Telecom), Satko, and
METU
TURNET
The tender was to be awarded through a two-stage process. First, the
participating companies would submit closed bids, which would be opened
at the same time. Second, Türk Telekom would conduct an open auction,
beginning with a revenue-sharing level equal to the most favorable bid. At
the Internet conference at Bilkent, the consortium of GlobalOne, Satko,
and METU was announced as the winner, with an offer of 70.2 percent.
The TURNET contract was signed on March 1, 1996, for a seven-year
term. Each year, Türk Telekom’s share was to increase, reaching 79.6% at
the end of the seventh year.23 The consortium initially invested $1.5 mil-
lion. TURNET began offering service in October 1996.
TURNET Topology
Once the award was made to the GlobalOne consortium, discussions be-
gan on topology. METU had been included in the consortium for its tech-
nical expertise. Not surprisingly, the topology proposed by METU in the
spring of 199524 was chosen. The topology was simple, laid out as a tri-
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angle with corners in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, as shown in Figure 3.
The backbone itself consisted of three 2 Mbps links and two international
connections, each 512 Kbps.
Between 1996 and 1999, the backbone was upgraded, but not signifi-
cantly. In 1997, Ankara’s link to Sprint was upgraded to 2 Mbps, and an
additional 2 Mbps link to Sprint was established from Istanbul. A review
of TURNET routers in September 1999 revealed the domestic and inter-
national backbone links and capacities shown in Figure 4. While the back-
bone links terminating in Izmir had the same capacity as they did in 1996
(even though traffic regularly reaches maximum capacity from about 9
a.m. until 4 p.m.), the capacity between Istanbul and Ankara was increased
by 300 percent through the addition of two new frame relay lines, with 2
Mbps and 4 Mbps capacity. The international capacity has also increased
substantially, so that now Istanbul and Ankara each have three 2 Mbps
fiber-optic links to AT&T, Sprint, and MCI/Worldcom, all terminating in
the United States.
Emergence of Internet Service Providers
Once TURNET went online in the fall of 1996, the Internet service pro-
vider (ISP) market exploded. Prior to TURNET, fewer than 10 companies
offered Internet service. By the end of the first year of operation, the total
number of ISPs leasing connections to TURNET was 69.
Between September 1997 and May 1999, the dynamism of the ISP
market and some constraints were apparent. The aggregate capacity of
connections to the backbone increased by 164 percent, but the number of
ISPs increased by only 16 percent. Of the 69 ISPs in operation after
TURNET’s first year, 15 (22 percent) failed to survive until May 1999.
During the same period, 26 new ISPs came into existence.
The barriers to entry for ISPs were low. There were no licensing fees
to speak of. The costs are in hardware, connection fees, personnel, and
operating costs. The technical barriers to entry were low in Turkey be-
cause of the requirement that all ISPs had to connect to TURNET. A new
ISP did not need to acquire for itself an international connection; it merely
needed to obtain a leased line from Türk Telekom to TURNET, a much
simpler and cheaper proposition. Because the ISP market is unregulated,
ISPs are free to offer whatever services they wish and charge whatever
price they can. Competition for customers is intense and has led to some
creative marketing strategies. For example, VestelNet, the ISP owned by a
leading manufacturer of electronic equipment, in May 1999 began offer-
ing users a free personal computer when they sign up for three years of
service at $30 per month. The company was signing up new users at the
rate of 50,000 per month.
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There remained two principal constraints on ISPs. First, the back-
bone capacity of TURNET did not increase at a rate commensurate with
the growth in ISP connectivity. While the overall capacity of the backbone
doubled from 1996 to 1999, the aggregate capacity of ISP connections
tripled from 1997 to 1999.
Second, ISPs have been restricted in their ability to acquire additional
infrastructure, particularly international connectivity. International con-
nections had to be acquired through Türk Telekom. Türk Telekom had
clear policies prohibiting a company from using the links to carry third-
party data. At the outset of TURNET, ISPs had little choice but to rely on
the international connectivity provided by TURNET. As Internet services
became more popular, however, Türk Telekom eased some of these re-
strictions, permitting, for example, a designated set of so-called interna-
tional business service providers to sell international connectivity. Today,
all of the largest ISPs and several universities have their own international
satellite links, in addition to their connection to TURNET. Some ISPs
have direct international capacity that is nearly equivalent to TURNET’s
total international capacity.
The creation of the ISP market marked a significant shift in the way
communications and related services are offered in Turkey. While the le-
gal framework did not change substantially, policy and practice permit-
ted, for almost the first time, private companies to offer communications
services under something other than a revenue-sharing arrangement. ISPs
paid a fixed monthly fee for their leased lines rather than a fraction of
revenue, and Türk Telekom placed no restrictions on the kinds of services
that could be offered or the prices that would be charged for these ser-
vices.
Operational Issues
While the winning TURNET bid of 70 percent of revenue to Türk Telekom
seemed incredibly favorable to the company, it turned out to be seriously
flawed. First, any investment in the network had to be paid for by the
winning consortium. Since the consortium was receiving only 30 percent
of TURNET revenue, it could not spend a great deal on the network and
still realize a profit. In practice, the financial arrangements created disin-
centives to investment, and under the terms of the agreement, Türk Telekom
was not permitted to invest any money in TURNET. Second, Türk Telekom
performed only routine operational management of the backbone and
was forbidden to make investments in its expansion. As a result of the
shortcomings of the legal and financial arrangement under which TURNET
was organized, the capacity of TURNET did not keep up with demand.
International links were completely saturated for most of the daytime hours.
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0822 Service
The TURNET backbone provided local access to a very limited geographic
area, albeit one that is home to nearly half of the country’s population.
The 0822 service was one of the indicators of the eagerness of policy-
makers within Türk Telekom and the Ministry of Transport and Telecom-
munications to make the Internet accessible throughout the country. The
number 0822 is an access code (similar to area codes in the United States).
Internet service providers may be given an 0822 number that subscribers
may use to establish a dial-up connection to their ISP. What is distinctive
about this number is that the per-minute rates are lower than local tele-
phone calls.25 This is true even for long-distance calls from the far eastern
portion of the country. Although the quality of connections is occasion-
ally problematic, the 0822 access service provided for the first time, at
Türk Telekom’s expense, Internet access in all provinces and villages in
the country.
TTNet
By 1997 the technical and operational shortcomings of TURNET had
become severe enough that a significant change or upgrade had to be
made to the network. In that year the government of Turkey changed, and
a new minister, Necdet Menzir, was appointed to the Ministry of Trans-
port and Telecommunications. At the encouragement of H. Tahir Dengiz,
the undersecretary of MTT who is the leading Internet advocate within
the ministry, he became the first MTT minister to take an active interest in
the Internet. Recognizing the potential of the Internet, he accepted recom-
mendations to invest heavily in infrastructure.
The question of how to fund development of a new national infra-
structure was a pressing one. By 1997, awareness of the Internet in policy-
making circles was substantially greater than in 1995. Efforts by leading
advocates within Turkey had succeeded in convincing many policy-makers
of the importance of the technology. They, the populace, and the press
could not fail to see the attention being paid to the Internet in interna-
tional circles. The new environment, coupled with the failure of the
organizational arrangements on which TURNET was based, convinced
Türk Telekom to seek direct funding for the new backbone. The govern-
ment agreed to allocate $35 million for the purchase of equipment and
expertise to build a national ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) net-
work, called TTNet. The contract was awarded to Alcatel after a com-
petitive bid.26
The proposed topology of TTNet is shown in Figure 5.































































































































































































































































































































































































TurkPak.1-54 1/11/01, 2:05 PM35
36
TTNet is a quantum improvement over TURNET for four principal
reasons. First, it offers a huge increase in both domestic and international
capacity. The aggregate capacity around the Istanbul–Izmir–Ankara tri-
angle is increasing by nearly two orders of magnitude. International ca-
pacity is increasing more than five times. Second, the geographic scope
of the Internet is expanding far beyond the Istanbul–Izmir–Ankara tri-
angle. While very basic dial-up connectivity at reasonable rates has been
available nationwide for some time, TTNet will offer the first multi-
Mbps access to the southern and eastern portions of the country. The
availability of access through the backbone itself will reduce the load on
intercity public switched telephone network (PSTN), further improving
the quality and availability of the latter service. Third, because much of
the backbone is based on a fiber, ATM network, TTNet provides a foun-
dation for offering to customers various value-added services, including
quality-of-service levels such as priority routing, security, etc. Fourth,
because it offers much enhanced capacity, TTNet is likely to cause the
demand for international satellite connections to decrease, causing price
reductions.
The TTNet rollout has taken longer than anticipated. Through much
of 1999, Türk Telekom announced that TTNet would begin offering ser-
vices “next month.”27 By July and August, traffic finally began moving
across some TTNet links in a trial capacity. By November 1999, only
nodes at Istanbul and Ankara were reportedly functioning. While the net-
work continues to expand, it has not reached the 140 points of presence
envisioned.
ULAKNET
In 1995, as TURNET was being established, TÜBITAK decided to get out
of the business of directly supporting the Internet in Turkey. However, a
TÜBITAK working group recommended the development of a national
education network. At the same time, TÜBITAK was being asked to as-
sume responsibility for the Central Library managed by the Higher Edu-
cation Council. By the mid-1990s, it was clear that a growing portion of
scientific information was electronic, or would be in the future. TÜBITAK
agreed to assume responsibility for the library, provided it also obtained
responsibility for establishing a national educational network. On June 1,
1996, the National Institutional Network and Information Association
(ULAKBIM) was created as a center of TÜBITAK.28 ULAKBIM’s mission
is to give technical help for the national information system by creating
connections between information centers.
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As soon as ULAKBIM was founded, work began on the creation of a
national academic network, called the Ulusal Akademik Ag (Net)—
ULAKNET.
ULAKNET Topology
ULAKNET’s backbone topology looks a great deal like TURNET. It con-
sists of a triangular loop linking Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, albeit of
much higher E3 (34 Mbps) capacity. Each university connects to the back-
bone through one of these three points via a frame relay connection of
between 64 Kbps and 2 Mbps.
ULAKNET is connected to the international Internet through three
asymmetric connections that offer greater capacity for traffic to Turkey
than for traffic from Turkey. The ULAKNET backbone and international
connections are shown in Figure 6. Each of the international connections
terminates in the United States.
Growth of ULAKNET
Once the first node (Ege University) was connected to the ULAKNET
backbone on February 14, 1997, expansion of the network was rapid.
ULAKBIM data indicate that the number of nodes connected to the net-




Table 12 collects estimates of the numbers of subscribers and users. The
figures from Çagiltay are based on an analysis of the domain name server
at METU. The analysis calculates the number of computers connected
to the Internet through an analysis of unique IP addresses and assumes
that there are 10 users for each such computer. These are the largest
figures quoted, and, as such, they represent something of an upper bound
on the number of users. While all such figures are estimates and subject
to critique, they show rapid growth of the Internet over the last year,
pushing Turkey from a Level 2 (Nascent) to a Level 3 (Established) in
1999, shown in Table 13. Growth appears to have continued unabated
in the year 2000, showing perhaps a 300–400 percent increase from
mid-1999 to mid-2000 and another 300 percent increase by the end of
2000. At the time of this writing, there could be 2–2.5 million Turks
using the Internet.
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Table 12. Estimates of Numbers of Internet Users
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Geographic Dispersion
As currently defined in the analytic framework, geographic dispersion is a
function of the fraction of first-tier political subdivisions with an Internet
point of presence. Turkey is an unusual country in this regard because it
has an unusually large number of first-tier political subdivisions (80 prov-
inces) for a country of its geographic area and population. Nevertheless,
Turkey is characterized by a rather dramatic jump from a very low degree
of geographic dispersion to a very high degree, with a short transitional
period consisting of an unusual means of achieving ready access through-
out the country.
In 1993, METU and TÜBITAK connected to the Internet in Ankara.
Through 1994, these organizations, through TR-NET, were the sole pro-
viders of Internet connectivity. All other nodes connected to them via leased
lines. By 1995, access to TR-NET was also available through Istanbul
Technical University. With the creation of TURNET, in 1996, the number
of cities with Internet points of presence expanded to three, leaving Tur-
key between Level 1 (Single Location) and Level 2 (Moderately Dispersed)
(see Table 14). By 1999, ISPs had expanded their coverage through leased
lines to the backbone to a total of 19 cities.
In 1997 Türk Telekom began offering ISPs 0822 access numbers. Users
could dial their ISP using this access code from anywhere in the country and
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pay metered rates that were less than those for local telephone calls. While
ISP POPs were located in only three cities, Internet access became available
in small cities and villages at costs that were no greater than for users in the
major cities. In effect, the Internet became readily available throughout the
country. Thus, while actual ISP POPs exist in only a minority of Turkish
provinces, Internet access is effectively nationwide. In 2000, the 0822 plan,
which involved a single code for the entire country, was changed to a re-
gional arrangement. In each of the seven regions, ISPs would be given a
special access number by which users within that region could access them.
To be reached, the ISP would have to have a point of presence within the
region. Consequently, the Internet is reachable in all regions, but users in















Table 14. Geographic Dispersion of the Internet in Turkey
Sectoral Absorption
The absorption of the Internet in various sectors of the Turkish economy is
very uneven (see Table 15). In some subsectors, tertiary education in par-
ticular, nearly all institutions are connected. In other sectors, such as health
care and government, Internet use is more the exception than the rule. The
commercial sector lies between the extremes. While the Internet is not com-
mon among Turkish companies as a whole, it is penetrating this sector at a
rapid rate. Figure 7 shows the number of domain names in each of the
principal .tr subdomains for the months June 1999 through July 2000.








Overall, we estimate that sectoral absorption was at Level 1 (Rare)
1993–1995 and Level 2 (Moderate) since then (see Table 16). Rapid growth
in Internet use in the commercial sector and the introduction of TTNet
services to all areas of the country could result in Turkey’s moving to
Level 3 quite shortly.
Table 15. Absorption of the Internet in Sectors of the Turkish Economy
































































Table 16. Sectoral Absorption of the Internet in Turkey



































































































mil.tr bbs.tr nom.tr net.tr k12.tr edu.tr gov.tr org.tr gen.tr com.tr Total
Education
As in many countries, the academic community pioneered the Internet in
Turkey. Thanks to sustained interest, activity, and support from both in-
dividual and organizational champions, the Internet has progressed steadily
among Turkish universities. While more than 10 percent of universities
were connected through TR-NET, ULAKNET has pushed the penetration
of the Internet to nearly all universities, over 90 percent. As of June 1999,
only seven universities out of 96 had not been connected.30 This does not
mean, however, that all campuses of each university have been connected.
The situation in K–12 education is quite different. First, there are
70,000 K–12 schools in Turkey, nearly three orders of magnitude more
Figure 7. Number of Domain Names in Turkish Top-Level Subdomains
(June 1999 through July 2000)
Source: K. agiltay, ÒDetayli AnalizlerÓ (ÒDetailed AnalysesÓ) (August 2000), <http://php.indiana.edu/
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than the number of universities. Connecting a substantial fraction of these
schools to the Internet would be a major undertaking under the best of
circumstances. In Turkey, efforts to bring the Internet to primary and sec-
ondary educational facilities are hampered by a number of factors: low
wages make it difficult to attract technically skilled individuals into the
teaching profession, and leased lines require good copper connections,
which are lacking in many parts of the country.
By 1999, approximately 100 k12.tr domain names had been registered.31
The Ministry of Education has succeeded in obtaining World Bank
funding to bring the Internet to K–12 schools, however.32 The first phase
of the project would bring 50,000 personal computers to 2,500 K–12
schools and connect them to the Internet. Subsequent phases would con-
nect most of the remaining schools. Even with the necessary funding,
achieving widespread absorption of the Internet in public schools is a
colossal undertaking that goes far beyond providing hardware and soft-
ware. To establish just one expert in each school would require nearly
70,000 trained or self-taught teachers.
While sectoral absorption at the university level would be ranked as
Great Majority, Internet connectivity in K–12 is Minimal. While in abso-
lute terms the K–12 situation dominates the sectoral absorption equation,
we feel that the importance and progress of the university community
justifies ranking sectoral absorption in Turkish education as Medium.
Commercial
The commercial sector now boasts one of the fastest-growing Internet
communities in Turkey. Between 1995 and 1997 the number of com.tr
domain names grew from fewer than 100 to more than 4,000, with a
more than seven-fold increase between 1996 and 1997 as commercial
ventures flocked to TURNET. Between 1997 and 1999, the number of
commercial domain names rose to nearly 11,000.33 While these numbers
still represent only 10–20 percent of the commercial firms in Turkey, there
is little doubt that the number will continue to grow rapidly.
Health Care
The Internet has made little penetration into the Turkish health-care sys-
tem. Two hospitals in Istanbul, Florence Nightingale and American, are
connected and have been pursuing some telemedicine applications. How-
ever, these are the exception. By one estimate, there is an upper bound of 50
health-care facilities in Turkey connected to the Internet. Overall, far fewer
than 10 percent of health-care facilities are connected to the Internet. Health-
care facilities do use computers, and many have local area networks. How-
ever, members of the health-care profession apparently perceive the Internet
to have little value in their ability to provide care for the populace.
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Public
The public sector has not been quick to assimilate the Internet, and the progress
that has been made has usually come through the determined efforts of a few
persistent individuals. For many public institutions, such as local and regional
governments, the costs of leased-line connectivity to the remote TURNET
backbone have greatly exceeded whatever small perceived benefit there may
have been. The central government in Ankara has no such excuse. Here the
slow absorption has to do with issues of the relationship between the govern-
ment and the governed, the level of awareness of the Internet by politicians,
the availability of skilled technical support, and other factors addressed be-
low. At the same time, the number of central government ministries with at
least one connection to the Internet has increased substantially within the last
two years. Between 1996 and 1999, the number of .gov.tr domains grew
from just under 50 to approximately 300. There are just a handful of .mil.tr
domains.34 While TÜBITAK was one of the initiators of the Internet in Tur-
key, use by government remains Minimal (<10% percent) to this day.
Connectivity Infrastructure
Connectivity infrastructure comprises four components: the aggregate
bandwidth of the domestic backbone(s), the aggregate bandwidth of the
international IP links, the number and type of interconnection exchanges,
and the type and sophistication of local access methods being used. Table
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Table 17. Connectivity Infrastructure of the Internet  in Turkey










1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Year
International Links
International connectivity has been the main bottleneck of the Turkish
Internet since its inception. The costs of international connections and
restrictions in the past on ISPs having direct international connections
have kept aggregate bandwidth low. Only in the last two years has the
aggregate bandwidth increased significantly. The expansion has come
from three quarters: sharp increases associated with TTNet, upgrades
to TURNET and ULAKNET, and growth in direct international lines
leased by ISPs. The latter have almost come to dominate the equation
in the last two years, accounting for more than half of the interna-
tional connectivity in 1998 and over a third in 1999. Figure 8 shows
the rapid recent growth in international connectivity. Nevertheless,
Turkish international connectivity is still below OC-3 levels, although
a third connection at E3 from TTNet to the Internet will make it slightly
above. It is likely that in the year 2000 the aggregate international
connectivity of Turkey will exceed 200 Mbps on the strength of TTNet
connections and ISPs’ direct leased lines. This would push Turkey into
Level 3 (Broad) for this component of the connectivity infrastructure
dimension.
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Year
Domestic Backbone
The growth in aggregate bandwidth of the domestic backbone is shown
in Figure 9. The growth in backbone bandwidth has come almost exclu-
sively from the introduction of new networks. Domestic bandwidth rose
from 128 Kbps to over 6 Mbps when TURNET began offering service.
When ULAKNET was introduced in 1997, backbone capacity jumped
from 6 Mbps to 109 Mbps. Backbone capacity will take another huge
jump as TTNet is rolled out. Once a backbone is installed, it is upgraded
infrequently. TURNET’s 2 Mbps triangle remained unchanged from 1996
until 1999. ULAKNET’s domestic links are not likely to be upgraded in
the near future since they are greatly underutilized.
The introduction of TURNET was enough to move Turkey from Level
1 (Thin) to Level 2 (Expanded) for the domestic backbone component of
connectivity infrastructure. The introduction of TTNet is pushing it into
Level 3 (Broad).
Figure 9. Aggregate Domestic Backbone Bandwidth
Internet Exchanges
Unlike some other countries, Turkey has never had a time when Internet
service providers could only exchange traffic by routing traffic out of the
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traditional Internet exchange point (IXP) for exchanging traffic. Rather,
ISPs have exchanged traffic by connecting to the national backbone. Ini-
tially, TR-NET served in this capacity. TURNET became the government’s
official Internet backbone, and TTNet will continue this tradition. One of
the factors motivating Türk Telekom to create TURNET was the desire
to not have ISPs route internationally traffic that was both originated and
terminated in Turkey.35 ISPs that have leased their own satellite connec-
tions also have the option of exchanging traffic with other ISPs that share
the connection. As long as each ISP has a connection to TURNET (soon
TTNet), they are permitted to create separate exchanges amongst them-
selves. There have reportedly been efforts to create an IXP between ISPs,
but these discussions have not been successful. Part of the reason has been
that the low amount of inter-ISP traffic has not made the issue a terribly
pressing one. If TTNet lives up to its promises, then the capacity for inter-
ISP exchange should be sufficient, again easing the pressure on ISPs to
create their own.
We rate Turkey at Level 2 (Expanded) for the IXP component of con-
nectivity infrastructure, which it has been since the inception of TURNET
in 1996.
Access Methods
Turkey has been at least at Level 2 (Expanded) with regard to access meth-
ods since the first Internet links went live. The initial link between METU
and TÜBITAK was a 64 Kbps link. While Türk Telekom has not always
provided leased lines in a timely manner, it has offered 64 Kbps service
and better for many years. By the time TURNET began offering service,
ISPs like SuperOnline were leasing 1 Mbps lines. The ability to access the
Internet via modem, or via a leased line with greater than 64 Kbps, rates
as Level 3 (Broad) in this component of the connectivity infrastructure
dimension.
The more interesting question, perhaps, is whether or not less than 90
percent of Internet access is via modem. At present, few ISPs and few
points of presence offer high-speed Internet access services such as ISDN
or xDSL. Of the approximately 140 TTNet points of presence, only nine
are scheduled to offer ISDN service, and none of these is outside of Istanbul,
Izmir, and Ankara. Only 26 will offer asynchronous digital subscriber line
(ADSL) service.
While a very small fraction of users accessing the Internet from home
use anything other than modems, a significant fraction of Internet users
do not access the Internet from home. Students have access through their
universities. Internet cafés that attract large numbers of customers have
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begun accessing ISPs through leased lines, although most Internet cafés
still access their ISPs using dial-up connections.
Connectivity Infrastructure Rating
Table 18 shows changes in the connectivity infrastructure as reflected in
the Levels (0-4) of the analytic framework. The data show steady im-
provement, with relatively slower improvement in the areas of interna-
tional connectivity and Internet exchanges. The former has been a pe-
rennial bottleneck of the Turkish Internet. The latter reflects the role of
the telecommunications monopoly in providing the backbone shared by
all ISPs.
Table 18. Evolution of Connectivity Infrastructure in Turkey
2991 3991 4991 5991 6991 7991 8991 9991
lanoitanretnI
ytivitcennoC
0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
citsemoD
enobkcaB
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 3
tenretnI
segnahcxE
0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
sseccA
sdohteM
0 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
llarevO 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 5.2
Organizational Infrastructure
The organizational infrastructure existing today in Turkey reflects a
somewhat unusual mixture of free market and monopolistic policies.
At one extreme, the basic telecommunications regime established by
the Turkish constitution mandates that communications services should
be provided by government employees, i.e., by a government monopoly.
At the other extreme, the ISP market today is highly dynamic and com-
petitive. In the middle is Türk Telekom, a government-owned joint
stock company struggling to define its role while being pushed from
all directions by a host of stakeholders with often conflicting demands.
During the mid-1990s, Turkey moved quickly from Level 1 (Single)
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through Level 2 (Controlled) to Level 3 (Competitive), where it stands
today (see Table 19).
Bending the Rules
During the first two years of its existence, the Internet existed as a non-
commercial entity. Until 1995 the Internet was viewed by Türk Telekom
as something of an experimental technology rather than a commercial
source of communications services. Provision of domestic and interna-
tional links for Internet purposes was a complete monopoly.
In 1995, however, as efforts to establish TURNET moved forward,
the issue of who could provide Internet services had to be resolved. Under
a strict interpretation of the constitutional guidelines no commercial ISPs
could exist. One of the more interesting aspects of the Internet in Turkey
is the lengths to which the government has gone to enable the Internet to
flourish, without completely running afoul of the constitution.






















TurkPak.1-54 1/11/01, 2:06 PM50
51
In the years that followed, however, Türk Telekom relaxed some of
these proscriptions, albeit often in a way that preserved some semblance
of monopoly. For example, with TURNET, Türk Telekom encouraged the
creation of commercial, independent ISPs as long as they connected to
TURNET. Türk Telekom also began permitting private companies to of-
fer international satellite lines to ISPs and other companies, the so-called
international business services companies, provided they were licensed to
do so by Türk Telekom and paid Türk Telekom a percentage of the
proceeds. The most curious semantic twist was a redefinition of the ser-
vices ISPs were providing. The argument was made that ISPs were not
providing fundamental communications services at all, but rather were
providing some value-added services (computer applications). Even voice
over Internet, which is permitted in Turkey, is considered data communi-
cations, rather than voice, and thus a value-added service.
In short, Turkey has employed in no small measure a sleight of hand
to permit the Internet to flourish. As one official put it, “So as to not cut
the Internet in Turkey, we are not seeing them [the ISPs]”!
Future
One obvious solution to the dilemma of government provision of a largely
unregulated service would be to change the constitution. However, there
does not appear to be the political will in Turkey to do this. Such a change
would require the support of two-thirds of the parliament.
By 2005 at the latest, Türk Telekom will be privatized, however. Tur-
key has signed the World Trade Organization agreement, which man-
dates the privatization of telecommunications by the year 2005.36 In the
meantime, although ISPs and others love to complain about Türk Telekom,
the relationship between the government monopoly and the ISPs is a posi-
tive and mutually beneficial one that has done a great deal to promote the
Internet in Turkey.
Sophistication of Use
The data on pervasiveness and sectoral absorption indicate that the vast
majority of Turkish citizens and companies are not using the Internet. For
those that are, however, during the last year or two a few companies have
made use of the Internet in ways that are transforming their businesses
and personal interactions, although not necessarily in ways that advance
the state of the art worldwide. At the same time, the number of companies
and individuals who have made the Internet part of their daily activities in
some fashion has grown to the point where such users are no longer con-
sidered novelties. The rapid expansion of the Internet user community
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means, however, that there continue to be many users who have only
begun to use the technologies.
Overall, Turkey’s user community is probably at Level 2 (Conven-
tional), with a few but growing number of users at Level 3 (Transform-
ing). The Internet has clearly “taken hold,” but the number of companies
or individuals using the Internet to change significantly their processes
and practices remains small (see Table 20).
For individuals, anecdotal evidence suggests that the principal uses of
the Internet are (1) games, (2) Internet chat, and (3) Web surfing (espe-
cially pornography). Each of these reflects a user community that is com-
fortable with the medium, yet not one that is using the Internet to create
new and enduring social networks, for example. ICQ is used by some, but
it is eclipsed by the tremendous popularity of online chat.
Most of the companies using the Internet are establishing a rudimen-
tary presence on the Web and perhaps beginning to learn about electronic
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commerce. The set of companies making transformative use of the Internet
is, at present, rather circumscribed. In conversations with industry ob-
servers in Turkey, the same examples of leading Internet use are repeated
again and again. They include:
 • Banks. Since 1997, banks have been offering so-called “Internet
branches” where customers can carry out many of the kinds of trans-
actions they would normally do in a physical branch office. Banks
have strong incentives to move customers from the branches to the
Internet: First, they can cut costs. A transaction carried out in a branch
costs 18 times more than one carried out on the Internet. Second, by
reducing the number of customers in the branches, queues are short-
ened and quality of service improves. Third, branch employees can
spend more time providing customized service to the most profitable
customers, improving profitability. To encourage customers to use
the Internet, banks are waiving the customary transaction fees. Such
efforts have encouraged many users and business to use the Internet
for the first time. Banks are also using the Web to accept loan and
other applications.
 • Mig˘ros Supermarket. Mig˘ros allows you to place your supermarket
order over the Internet. If you place an order of more than 10 million
TL ($23 in July 1999), the store will deliver your order at no extra
charge.
 • SuperOnline. As part of its effort to create a portal that will draw
customers repeatedly, SuperOnline has placed a financial simulation
game on its website. The simulation permits people to invest “virtual
money” in the financial markets and track the value of the “portfo-
lio.”
 • Newspapers. Nearly all Turkish newspapers provide content on the
Internet, playing a particularly important role in informing Turks liv-
ing abroad.
 • Some ISPs are partnering with cellular phone companies to pro-
vide integrated services, such as the ability to send a webpage to a
pager.
Analytic Framework Dimensions
Figure 10 illustrates the changes in the Internet dimensions since 1992,
the year before the Internet was first established. The figure shows only
years in which developments resulted in a change in value in at least one
dimension.
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Particularly noteworthy are the dramatic jump in geographic disper-
sion, the significant gains in pervasiveness and organizational infrastruc-
ture, and steady improvement of the connectivity infrastructure.
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4. The Internet in Pakistan
Introduction
History
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, shown in Figure 11, was formed in 1947
by the partitioning of British India into India and Pakistan. The partition
line was drawn through the formerly unified Punjab, with portions of Jammu
and Kashmir in each new country. Immediately following partition, 12–14
million refugees crossed the dividing line, seeking safety with their co-reli-
gionists. In 1947 and 1948, efforts by the Muslim leader of the predomi-
nantly Hindu Junagadh and the Hindu ruler of the predominantly Muslim
Kashmir to join Pakistan and India respectively led to the first war between
these two states. An inability to resolve the dispute over the Kashmir region
led to a second war in 1965 and a third armed conflict May–June 1999.
The conflict with India has been one of the defining features of Pakistan’s
modern history, affecting Pakistan’s foreign policy and economy.
In addition to conflicts with India, Pakistan suffered a brutal civil war
in 1971 that preceded the independence of Bangladesh, formerly East Paki-
stan.
While war and continuing conflict with India has been one defining
quality of modern Pakistan, political instability has been a second. With
the end of the civil war, the military ruler of Pakistan, General Agha
Muhammad Yahya Khan, turned power over to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a
foreign minister under a previous regime. Bhutto nationalized the basic
industries, insurance companies, domestically owned banks, and schools
and colleges. He also instituted land reforms that benefited tenants and
middle-class farmers.
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Against a backdrop of claims of election fraud, General Muhammad
Zia Ul-Haq staged a successful coup on July 5, 1977. Zia was the first
leader to turn the country away from secularism. He supplanted the civil
code with Islamic law, the sharia, and started the trend toward orthodoxy.
Following his death in a plane crash in 1988, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of
the former prime minister, was appointed prime minister after her party, the
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), won a general election in November. She was
dismissed on corruption charges in 1990 and re-elected in 1993. The Bhutto
government was again dismissed on charges of corruption in 1996. Elec-
tions in February 1997 brought to power Nawaz Sharif and his Pakistan
Muslim League. Sharif himself was ousted in a coup in October 1999.
Politics
Pakistan is a democratic Islamic republic with a parliamentary system of
government. The bicameral parliament of Majlis-e-Shoora consists of the
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Senate (87 seats; members are indirectly elected by provincial assemblies
to serve six-year terms) and the National Assembly (217 seats, of which
10 represent non-Muslims; members are elected by popular vote to serve
five-year terms). The president is elected by parliament for a five-year
term.37
When Mohammed Nawaz Sharif became prime minister in 1997, he
combined measures designed to bring economic liberalization, stability,
and growth with those to solidify his own position. Among his first mea-
sures was the Pakistan 2010 Programme (described below). This program
laid out a number of measures designed to cure some of the fundamental
ailments of Pakistan and its economy: corruption, a depressed economy,
low per capita income, low investment, violence, and political instability.
Some early measures included broad reforms of the tax and tariffs laws,
reducing and streamlining them in an effort to stimulate economic growth.38
On the political side, he weakened the presidency with a constitu-
tional amendment that stripped the president of his power to dismiss the
National Assembly, ousted a chief justice of the Supreme Court, and re-
versed the traditional balance of power between the military and civilian
government. He carried out a campaign of intimidation against the press
and sought (unsuccessfully) to push through parliament a bill making Is-
lamic Law the supreme authority in Pakistan. The Economist wrote:
Pakistan has been run by such dreadful governments
for so long that it seems barely worth remarking on any
deterioration. But whereas previous governments were
chaotic in their awfulness, this one has turned out to be
systematic. Over the past two years Nawaz Sharif, the
prime minister, has been picking off individuals and in-
stitutions that he believes pose any threat to his own
power. He has seen off a president and the chief of the
army staff, and is now trying to push through a consti-
tutional amendment that would give him sweeping pow-
ers to ignore Pakistan’s legislature and provincial gov-
ernments in the name of Islamisation.39
Sharif was not able to deliver on his promises or hold onto his control.
While the explosions of nuclear weapons in May 1998 provided a morale
boost to much of the country, they did nothing to address structural weak-
nesses and, in light of world reaction, ultimately harmed the economy.
Reports of political, legislative, judicial, and financial crises quickly sapped
the enthusiasm over Pakistan’s response to Indian tests. Murders and other
forms of lawlessness in Karachi and elsewhere created a climate little condu-
cive to investment and trade.40 In May 1999, Pakistan-backed guerrillas
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invaded Indian Kashmir, only to retreat a few weeks later. The dissolu-
tion of a battlefield victory into a diplomatic loss left many in the army
and the country disillusioned with Sharif.41 Given the history of Pakistan’s
prime ministers, his ouster in a coup in October 1999 was not particu-
larly startling.
Economy
Since Pakistan was founded in 1947, the economy has been characterized
by periods of relative hopefulness and growth that are usually overshad-
owed by longer periods of stagnation or decline precipitated by economic
shocks and sustained by systemic weaknesses. The 1960s were years of
considerable growth. The real GDP grew by an average of 6.8 percent per
year at a time when major advances were taking place in the agricultural
and industrial sectors. During these years Pakistan pursued an import-
substitution, highly protectionist policy. The Green Revolution fueled the
growth of the agricultural sector.
During the 1970s, Pakistan experienced a series of disruptions to its
economy: The country engaged in a civil war in which India intervened in
1971; land reforms created considerable uncertainty; instability was a domi-
nant characteristic of the political scene; a cotton virus severely impacted
Pakistan’s largest export commodity; nationalization in 1972 shattered in-
vestor confidence; and oil prices increased five-fold in 1973. These and
other factors contributed to a prolonged recession for most of the decade.
During the 1980s, policy changes favoring gradual decontrol, deregula-
tion, and denationalization began to pay dividends, and, with the improving
global economy, Pakistan experienced growth rates comparable to those of
the 1960s. However, most of this growth was due to increases in factor inputs
(labor and capital) rather than from improvements in productivity.42 The real
GDP grew at an annual rate of 6.5 percent, helped by 4.1 percent growth in
agriculture and 8.2 percent growth in large-scale manufacturing.
During the 1990s, the economy again has experienced substantial
deceleration (see Table 21). Between 1991 and 1997, the real GDP growth
rate declined to 4.7 percent per annum. According to the Pakistan 2010
Programme, the factors that have been most responsible for the worsen-
ing economic landscape are: political instability (between 1988 and 1996
Pakistan saw the dismissal of three elected governments and four care-
taker regimes); worsening of law and order in major growth areas of the
country; setbacks to the cotton crop and consequential increases in cotton
prices that adversely affected textile and related industries; inadequate
power supply along with frequent breakdowns of power units around
industrial areas; emergence of significant infrastructural bottlenecks in
power, transport, and other sectors; and insufficient industrial investment.43
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Geography and Demographics
Pakistan is a country of the Southern Asian littoral of 803,940 square kilo-
meters on the northeastern tip of the Northern Arabian Sea. It has 1,046
kilometers of coastline and shares land borders with Iran (909 kilometers)
to the west, Afghanistan (2,430 kilometers) to the north, China (523 kilo-
meters) to the northeast, and India (2,912 kilometers) to the east.
The climate and terrain of Pakistan are both varied and difficult. In
the east is the flat Indus plain, and mountains rise in the north and north-
west, tapering off to the Balochistan plateau in the west. As a result the
climate is mostly hot, dry desert, with a more temperate climate in the
northwest and arctic conditions in the Hindu Kush and Karakoram moun-
tains of the north.
Pakistan’s natural resources include extensive natural gas reserves,
limited petroleum, poor quality coal, iron ore, copper, salt, and limestone.
About 23 percent of the country’s land is arable, and agricultural enter-
Population ............................... 139 million (Jan. 1998 est.)a
130.6 million (1998 est.)b
Population growth rate ............ 2.7—3.0% (July 1999 est.)
GDP ........................................ $59 billion (1998—1999 est.)
GDP per capita ........................ $441 (1998—1999 est.)
Inflation rate ............................ 13.9%
Literacy.................................... 45% (unofficial: 35%)
Telephones .............................. 3.2 million (1997 est.)
4 million (1999 est.)
Teledensity .............................. 1.78 per 100 people  (1997)c
2.25 per 100 people (1999)
3.49 per 100 people (2000 est.)
Sources: M. Ali, ÒPakistan: Telecommunications & Politics,Ó Middle East
Communications (November 1997): 13—18; Central Intelligence Agency,
ÒPakistan,Ó in The World Factbook (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1999), <http://
www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pk.html> (October 16, 1999); Bureau
of South Asian Affairs, Pakistan: Background Notes (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of State, March 2000), <http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/pakistan/
bnotes.html> (October 14, 2000).
a U.S. Department of State, Country Commercial Guides FY 1999: Pakistan
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1999), <http://www.state.gov/www/
about_state/business/com_guides/1999/sa/pakistan99_10.html> (October 16, 1999).
b ÒIndia and Pakistan: Not Cricket,Ó The Economist (May 22, 1999): 3—5.
c ÒIn Brief: Pakistan,Ó Middle East Communications (July 1997): 8.
Table 21. Pakistan in Statistics
TurkPak.55-129 1/11/01, 2:13 PM59
60
prise occupies about 46 percent of the 36 million-strong labor force. Fre-
quent natural disasters, principally earthquakes and flooding along the
Indus River after heavy rains, hamper the government’s attempts to de-
velop a sustainable infrastructure.
The capital of Pakistan is Islamabad. The country is divided into four
provinces, plus the autonomous Tribal Areas Territory, the Islamabad Capi-
tal Territory, and two Federally Administered Regions. The Pakistani-
administered portion of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region is known
as Azad Jammu, and Kashmir is officially “independent,” according to
Pakistani government policy, which does not recognize the 1947 UN par-
tition of Kashmir.
According to 1999 estimates, the population of Pakistan is about 138
million people, with an annual growth rate of 2.18 percent. The major
ethnic groups in Pakistan include Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun (Pathan), Baloch,
and Muhajir (Muslim immigrants from India at the time of partition in
1947 and their descendents). Although the official language is Urdu, it is
considered their first language by only about 7 percent of the population.
English is the second official language, and is the lingua franca of Pakistani
elite and most government ministries. Other languages widely used include
Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtu, and Balochi. The population is 97 percent Muslim
(Sunni 77 percent, Shi’a 20 percent); the remainder is predominantly Chris-
tian or Hindu. About 33 percent of the population is literate.
Networks in Pakistan
A Brief History of Telecommunications
Until 1990, telecommunications services in Pakistan were provided by
the Telephone & Telegraph (T&T) Department of the Ministry of Com-
munications, which oversaw on the order of 800,000 telephone lines
throughout the country. Like many such providers in other countries, the
T&T had limited autonomy to plan, execute, and finance expansion of
telecommunications services or networks.
During the 1980s, global trends toward deregulation, privatization,
and open markets combined with substantial technological innovations
in telecommunications and data networks to push the issue of telecom-
munications infrastructure to the forefront of many countries’ policy-
making efforts. These trends, coupled with the often not-so-subtle en-
couragement of international financial institutions, led policy-makers in
many developing countries to consider the importance of a sound tele-
communications infrastructure to the future health and growth of their
economies.
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Pakistani policy-makers realized the value of an expanded and com-
petitive telecommunications sector and passed the Pakistan Telecommu-
nications Corporation Act, 1991. This act restructured the T&T Depart-
ment into a state-owned corporation, the Pakistan Telecommunication
Corporation (PTC), with operational and financial autonomy. Some of
the stated goals of the measure were:
 • promotion and rapid development, modernization,
and diversification of telecommunications services;
 • improvement in performance quality of service and
operational efficiency of the telecommunications sec-
tor, especially with regard to basic services;
 • privatization of the PTC to help inject private sector
capital and skills into its operation;
 • encouragement of increasing private sector partici-
pation in telecommunication development;
 • facilitation of new investment and competition in tele-
communications by enabling a legal and regulatory
framework;
 • redefinition of the role of government from an op-
erator to that of a regulator.44
One of the very significant results of this reform was the introduction of
private operators to provide value-added services. Between 1991 and 1996,
the year of the next major restructuring of the telecommunications market, a
number of private companies received licenses for various services, including
data communications. In 1994, 15 companies were given licenses to operate
domestic data networks, with international links through PTC, servicing pri-
marily the business, industry, education, and government sectors.
Concurrently, the Pakistani government carried out a huge expansion
of the telecommunications system by PTC, which quadrupled the number
of lines (to 3.2 million) by 1997.45
The Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 (PTA
1996) introduced a new telecommunications regime through the creation
of the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, two new corporations out
of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation, and a Frequency Allo-
cation Board.46 The functions of the Pakistan Telecommunication Author-
ity (PTA) were to:
 • regulate the establishment, operation, and mainte-
nance of telecommunication systems and the provi-
sion of telecommunication services in Pakistan;
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 • receive and expeditiously dispose of applications for
the use of radio-frequency spectrum;
 • promote and protect the interests of users of tele-
communication services in Pakistan;
 • promote the availability of a wide range of high qual-
ity, efficient, cost effective, and competitive telecom-
munication services throughout Pakistan;
 • promote rapid modernization of telecommunication
systems and telecommunication services;
 • investigate and adjudicate on complaints and other
claims made against licensees arising out of alleged
contraventions of the provisions of [the PTA 1996],
the rules made, and the licenses issued thereunder
and take action accordingly;
 • make recommendations to the Federal Government
on policies with respect to international telecommu-
nications, provision of support for participation in
international meetings, and agreements to be ex-
ecuted in relation to the routing of international traf-
fic and accounting settlements; and
 • perform such functions as the Federal Government
may, from time to time, assign to it.47
The PTA 1996 also broke the Pakistan Telecommunication Corpora-
tion into two companies. The new Pakistan Telecommunication Com-
pany Limited (PTCL) received 95 percent of PTC’s infrastructure, assets,
resources, and employees. PTCL received a license from the PTA to pro-
vide “basic telephone service,” which the PTA 1996 defined as:
1. two-way live voice telephone service, in digital form
or otherwise, over any public fixed switched network
or between base stations or switches or modes of
any public mobile switched network;
2. real-time transmission or reception of facsimile im-
ages over a public fixed switched network;
3. international telephony service; and
4. the lease of circuits for the provision of the services
specified in (1), (2), and (3).48
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A second company, the National Telecommunication Corporation
(NTC), received 5 percent of PTC’s infrastructure, assets, resources, and
employees, and received a license from PTA to provide “telecommunica-
tions services within Pakistan on a non-exclusive basis only to the armed
forces, defense projects, Federal Government, Provincial Governments,
or such other Governmental agencies or Governmental institutions as the
Federal Government may determine; and . . . the National Telecommuni-
cation Corporation shall not sell its capacity on the telecommunication
system to any person other than such Government agencies or the
[PTCL].”49
The licensing of PTCL to be the sole provider of basic telephone
service and the creation of the PTA as the licensing authority with a
clear mandate to encourage provision of non-basic telephone services
opened the door for the creation of the Internet service provider mar-
ket.
Growth of Telephone Subscriber Lines
In spite of a poor economy, Pakistan has continued to make telecommuni-
cations a high priority for government spending. The Public Sector Devel-
opment Programme (PSDP) for 1999–2000 prioritized infrastructure de-
velopment and the telecommunications sector, to the tune of Rs 110 bil-
lion through 2000. Overall, the growth of telecommunications lines and
services has been a rather bright spot in a dreary economic landscape.50
By June 1998, Pakistan had an estimated 2.75 million phone lines. By
mid-1999, the number of telephone lines in Pakistan was expected to reach
nearly 4 million.51
The Origin of the Internet in Pakistan
In 1991, two Pakistani computer enthusiasts established a UUCP (Unix-
to-Unix CoPy) email connection to the global Internet from the
IMRAN.AR.PK host. Located in New York City, this node would batch
email traffic and, through an international phone call to Lahore, exchange
email with domestic servers.52
Following the introduction of the Mosaic web browser in 1993, the
Internet in the United States surged in size and popularity, with the com-
mercial sector experiencing the greatest rates of growth. By 1995, Pakistani
policy-makers had begun to appreciate the potential of the medium for
economic development. The IMRAN service proved sufficiently useful
that in 1995 the Pakistani government solicited proposals for establishing
a public email service.53 Sixteen companies were awarded licenses for email
and Internet services in February 1996.
TurkPak.55-129 1/11/01, 2:13 PM63
64
The Emergence of Internet Service Providers
Some of the licensees began offering service even before the regulatory
regime and their licenses were finalized. Digicom launched the first online
Internet service, in Karachi, in 1995. This service was connected to the
global Internet by a 64 Kbps line. In 1996, the PakNet data network,
operated by PTCL, was upgraded to provide Internet services as well.
PakNet was connected to the global Internet via a total of 512 Kbps. By
mid-1997, nine ISPs were operational, offering services in five cities to
approximately 25,000 subscribers.54 PTCL also offered Internet service in
10 cities to approximately 8,500 subscribers.
A multitude of Internet service providers emerged quickly following
the introduction of Internet service in 1995. The Pakistan Telecommuni-
cation Act, 1996 stated that “No licenses to provide basic telephone ser-
vice shall be issued by the [Pakistan Telecommunication] Authority for a
period of seven years from the effective date referred to in section 35
[October 13, 1996] vesting property in the [Pakistan Telecommunication]
Company other than to the National Telecommunication Corporation
and the [Pakistan Telecommunication] Company.”55 While it makes no
direct mention of the Internet, PTA 1996 does not prohibit the licensing
of private companies to provide a host of value-added services, including
Internet services.
By mid-1999, licenses to provide Internet service had been issued to
approximately 100 organizations, of which 50 were operating.56 NetMag,
an online magazine devoted to the Internet in Pakistan (http://netmag.com.pk),
listed 27 ISPs in its May–June 1999 issue. In its September–October 1999
issue, it listed 40, a 50 percent increase in four months. Since October,
this number appears to have stabilized, however, reflecting a saturation of
the ISP market, growing difficulty of startups to compete with established
ISPs, or both.
Internet Infrastructure Project
The most significant technical development affecting the Internet in Paki-
stan has been the Internet Infrastructure Project, initiated in 1998. This
project, phased over three years (1998–2000) and costing Rs 700 million,
is designed to accommodate 500,000 customers in 90 cities, including all
district towns.57
In August 1998, the board of directors of PTCL approved the invest-
ment of over Rs 3 billion ($56 million) for an expansion program of a
number of telecommunications services, including the Internet. The plan
involved the creation of three wholly owned subsidiaries, one of which,
Pak Internet Limited, was developed exclusively to provide Internet ser-
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vices. Rs 1 billion would be spent on creating the three subsidiaries, and
Rs 2 billion would be used to provide 750,000 new telephone lines over
an 18-month period ending in February or March 2000.58
In April 1999, the Planning Commission announced that the Public
Sector Development Programme (PSDP) for 1999–2000 would include
provisions for adding 300,000 new Internet connections.59
Phase 1 of the project was completed in August 1999, with testing
carrying through the end of September.60 This phase involved the addition
of 50,000 Internet connections;61 Internet service providers and dial-up
users in Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi/Islamabad were connected to
the new infrastructure in August, and those in Peshawar and Quetta were
connected in September.
Government Initiatives Impacting the Internet
Pakistan 2010 Programme
The Pakistan 2010 Programme was established by Prime Minister Moham-
med Nawaz Sharif in 1997 to bring about “the Quaid’s glorious vision.”
The vision is based on four goals:
1. justice for all Pakistanis, including women, minori-
ties, and other vulnerable groups;
2. tolerance of opinion, belief, custom, values, behav-
ior, life style, and knowledge;
3. knowledge for production and competition and for
its own sake; and
4. entrepreneurship, not in the sense of an ability to
exploit others, but rather as a behaviour that inno-
vates, produces, and serves society.62
Economic prosperity is essential to this vision. Good governance is
essential to economic prosperity. Therefore, the principal goals of the Pa-
kistan 2010 Programme were to establish good governance, double per
capita income, and ensure equitable access to economic opportunity and
quality social services.
According to policy-makers, economic prosperity also could not be
built on the “old paradigm” of infrastructure creation but had to be built
on the new paradigm of “knowledge creation and its utilization.” Among
the major Pakistan 2010 goals is the promotion of science and technol-
ogy.63 The Pakistan 2010 Programme establishes the shift from material-
based to knowledge-based production as one of the six key steps that
define the program’s Action Plan.
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A second shift is from material-based toward knowledge-
based production. The international context has changed
dramatically over the last fifty years, and comparative
advantage has shifted from those with access to raw
material to those with access to knowledge. Pakistan must
be prepared to operate in the new scenario. To this end,
policy must guide investment into high-tech areas,
through support for information technology, technical
education, incentives for knowledge production, provi-
sion of free and open access to information, opening up
credit markets to knowledge industries, and generally
creating and enabling [an] environment for research and
technology development. Accordingly, Pakistan 2010
includes a concerted programme for upgrading the sci-
ence and technology infrastructure in the country.64
The multiple objectives are intertwined. The shift to knowledge-based
production requires investment. Investment requires the creation of a posi-
tive investment climate. A positive investment climate requires the devel-
opment of “a sound and credible financial system, adequate ready credit
availability, a simple and transparent regulatory system (through autono-
mous statutory bodies wherever possible), a transparent and effective tax
and tariff system, a stable policy regime, a reliable certification system, a
planning system oriented toward indicative planning to assist investors in
forecasting future economic trends, collaborative policy making, and re-
vamped SROs.”65
Privatization of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited
In 1991, the Pakistani government established the Privatization Com-
mission with the goals of reducing the government’s debt and generat-
ing resources to reduce loan liabilities. In 1994, a decision was made to
privatize PTCL by selling a 26 percent stake in the company.66 By 1997,
the company still was not privatized, but the government borrowed Rs
250 million against the company’s future earnings through the sale of
bonds.67 The government of Pakistan continued to be unable to find a
suitable investor. In May 1997, privatization was postponed.68 A few weeks
later, Prime Minister Sharif mandated the sale of the company within a
year.69 No investor was forthcoming. Government changeovers, differing
views on how to sell the company’s assets, and financial crises in the inter-
national markets have all been identified as factors contributing to the
delay. By early 1999, the deadline for a sale had been pushed back to July
1999.70 Goldman Sachs was hired to formulate a strategy for privatizing
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PTCL, including a plan for road shows and seminars for the sale of the 26
percent.71 Following a visit to Pakistan in early 1999, Goldman Sachs set
a new deadline of February 2000 for the sale of the company.72
The prolonged effort to privatize PTCL revealed a conflict between
privatization and the goal of encouraging fledgling Internet services. In
order to make PTCL attractive to investors and minimize the government’s
budget deficit, the regulatory authorities in 1998 gave approval for a num-
ber of measures to enhance PTCL’s revenue stream.73 These included the
right to increase the telephone tariffs by Rs 55 per month and limit local
calls to five minutes. While the announcement of these rate increases was
accompanied by an announcement of a 15 percent reduction of nation-
wide calls and decreased connection charges, the latter were more than
offset by a Central Excise Duty of 15 percent. Each of these measures
increased the cost burden on users of local telephone service. Typical




The Internet user community in Pakistan has grown steadily since service
was first offered in 1995. Table 22 illustrates the growth in Internet sub-
scribers and users. Khan estimates that the number of users is approxi-
mately four times the number of subscribers.74
If Khan’s estimate is correct, and the percent of the population using
the Internet is four times greater than the percentages shown in Table 22,
then Pakistan passed from Level 1 (Embryonic) to Level 2 (Nascent) in
late 1997 at the earliest. If estimates that the number of Internet subscrib-
ers will increase by a factor of five by 2003 are correct, then it is possible
that Pakistan could reach Level 3 (Established) by that year. In conversa-
tions held in November 1999, representatives of ZoooomNet stated that
the number of subscribers had grown from 70,000 in 1998 to 250,000 in
the fourth quarter of 1999.75 As Table 22 shows, published reports have
rather different estimates of the number of Internet users and subscribers
in the year 2000. It is possible that the number of “users”  according to
the Inter Press Service and The News International Internet Edition actu-
ally refers to the number of subscribers or reflects old data, or both. The
significantly greater figures from the Business Recorder come from the
Centre for Research and Development at Iqra University. A 100 percent
increase in the number of subscribers between November 1999 and July
2000 would not be unprecedented, but such figures provide only a single
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Table 22. Number of Internet Subscribers and Users in Pakistan
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data point that must be verified. While it would not be surprising if all of
these figures are inflated, they point to very rapid growth of the user base
in Pakistan at present, with some possibility that Pakistan could reach
Level 3 (Established) as early as the year 2000 (see Table 23).
















As currently defined in the analytic framework, geographic dispersion is a
function of the fraction of first-tier political subdivisions with an Internet
point of presence. Pakistan is divided into four provinces (Balochistan,
North-West Frontier, Punjab, Sind), one territory (Administered Tribal
Area), and one capital territory (Islamabad Capital Territory). A review
of ISP websites during the summer and fall of 1999 showed advertised
presence as shown in Table 24. The numbers are not exact; many ISPs did
not indicate the cities in which they had POPs; others may not have pro-
vided complete listings. According to some sources, 30 cities in Pakistan
had ISP points of presence at that time.76
A geographic representation of this data is shown in Figure 12. This
figure shows that POPs are now found in all four Pakistani provinces.
The location of ISPs reflects the underlying geographic influence that
shapes not only the geographic dispersion of the Internet but the socio-
economic structure of the country itself. Most of Pakistan’s people, in-
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dustry, and power lie within the Indus River valley and the fertile basin
of its tributaries rather than in the mountains and plateaus of the west-
ern and northeastern portions of the country. Although Internet points
of presence are found in all provinces, rural access is by no means pub-
licly and commonly available. As a result, Pakistan cannot have a rating
higher than 3 (Highly Dispersed) for geographic dispersion, as indicated
in Table 25.
TurkPak.55-129 1/11/01, 2:13 PM70
71
Figure 12. ISP Concentration in Pakistani Cities (1999)
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Sectoral Absorption
The ratings shown in Table 26 put Pakistan at the low end of Level 2
(Moderate) for sectoral absorption (see Table 27). Currently, numerous
plans exist that, if brought to fruition, will change the sectoral absorption
substantially, making Pakistan a firm Level 2 or possibly even a Level 3.
Table 26 indicates that the commercial and public sectors are the most
promising candidates for a Medium sectoral absorption in the near term.
While most universities are likely to gain Internet access, a substantial
effort will be required to bring a significant fraction of primary and sec-
ondary schools online.
Table 26.
Absorption of the Internet in Sectors of the Pakistan Economy
























































While most colleges have dial-up access, according to one source less than
0.5 percent have leased-line connectivity.77 Connectivity among K–12
schools is very low. However, this may change. Ahsan Iqbal, deputy chief
of the Planning Commission, told a workshop on Private Sector Reforms
in Islamabad on June 9, 1999, that by the year 2005 every high school
student in Pakistan would have a computer.78
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Health Care
The PTA website lists only five health-care facilities. According to repre-
sentatives of ZoooomNet, only the Aga Khan Hospital in Karachi has
leased-line connectivity.79 While this is enough to establish that at least
one health-care facility has Internet connectivity, it is a vanishingly small
percentage of the health-care facilities that service the country.
Commercial
The commercial sector is difficult to evaluate. While the PTA website listed
115 commercial organizations evaluated for the survey of sophistication
of use, the actual number of commercial organizations using the Internet
is larger. We do not, however, have a precise count of the number of .com.pk
domains that have been registered. The Internet Software Consortium
July 1999 Internet Domain Survey (formerly done by Network Wizards)
counts 523 Level 2 domains under the .pk domain (e.g., netmag.com.pk).
If the collection of organizations on the PTA website has the same distri-
bution of organizations among the .com, .gov, etc. domains (certainly not
guaranteed), then one would conclude that 58 percent of the Pakistani
domains are commercial. If that is the case, then approximately 300 com-
mercial organizations have their own domain names under the .pk domain.
The specific numbers here are probably incorrect, being based on some
shaky assumptions. However, even if all 523 hosts were commercial, this
still probably does not represent 10 percent of the Pakistani companies
with more than 100 employees.
What makes Pakistan a bit unusual, however, is that according to
Hassan, most businesses are jointly owned by families but managed indi-
vidually. As families grow, they spin off new business units to give to the
younger generation rather than allowing businesses to grow. In addition,
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Pakistani laws have, to an extent, favored small firms over large.80 As a
result, the number of large companies is likely to be much smaller relative
to the population than would be the case in developed countries. Represen-
tatives of ZoooomNet claim that over 50 percent of Pakistani companies
with more than 100 employees have leased-line Internet connectivity.81
Additional research is required to reconcile this figure with the Network
Wizards data. However, it is likely that sectoral absorption among com-
mercial organizations will cross the 10 percent boundary soon, if it hasn’t
already.
Public
According to some observers, most central government ministries do
have leased-line connectivity to the Internet. Moreover, there are indica-
tors that the usage of computer networks could increase substantially in
the near future. These indicators include plans not only for new installa-
tions of networks but also, and perhaps more significantly, for the ex-
panded use and dissemination of government information by electronic
means.
On March 19, 1999, the interior minister of Pakistan unveiled plans
to link all district headquarters with provincial capitals and the federal
capital networks. Part of this plan included the creation of a computer-
based national registration system that would support the issuance of iden-
tity cards, new passports, and residency cards for overseas Pakistanis.82
According to Ahsan Iqbal, deputy chief of the Planning Commission, the
Pakistani federal government will spend $20 million on computerization
in the 12-month period from July 1999 to July 2000.83
Perhaps the provinces most actively pursuing computerization are
Punjab and Sind. In 1999 each established IT Promotion Boards to for-
mulate and implement strategies to maximize the use of computers in
every provincial government department.84 Punjab has been working on a
website on which to make available to the populace the laws and rules
and regulations of all provincial departments as well as any updates.85
The province also plans to spend over $8 million in 1999–2000 to com-
puterize land records in all the 34 revenue districts of Punjab.86 In Septem-
ber 1999, plans were announced to link all of the departments. A pilot
project, already underway, is linking the Governor House, the Chief Min-
ister House, and all provincial department heads.87
Connectivity Infrastructure
Pakistan’s ratings in the four components of the connectivity infrastruc-
ture dimension are shown in Table 28.
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International Connectivity
Pakistani ISPs must currently connect to the global Internet through an
international leased line to a global carrier, typically UUNET, Teleglobe,
or SINGNET. Some other ISPs use MCI or Sprint. These carriers do not
have a network access point (NAP) within Pakistan, so connections must
be made via two half-circuits, with the Pakistani half-circuit provided by
PTCL.88 Of the international circuits, 70 percent terminate in Karachi,
and 30 percent terminate in Islamabad.89
Due to the high cost of international bandwidth, ISPs typically have
no more than a 2 Mbps (E1) connection, and most have less than 1 Mbps.90
While the total international bandwidth to and from Pakistan was esti-
mated (July 1998) to be approximately 620 Mbps not including band-
width PTCL leased on See-Me-We 3,91 the ISPs use only a small fraction
of this, perhaps 5 percent. According to ZoooomNet representatives, the
total international IP bandwidth from Pakistan was 32 Mbps in 1999.92
Domestic Backbone
There does not exist a proper Internet backbone in Pakistan. Since there is
not even a network access point of the international carriers, traffic from
one ISP to another must leave the country, usually to the United States or
Canada, and return.93 The creation of such a backbone was a strong rec-
ommendation in a study by Shah.94
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According to some observers, one of the reasons for the lack of a
domestic backbone has been the lack of an organizational entity around
which to arrange it. The Internet Service Providers Association of Paki-
stan (ISPAK) was supposed to have played a role in providing a unified
voice for Internet service providers in their negotiations with the Pakistan
Telecommunication Authority. However, this objective has not, appar-
ently, been realized.
One of the more enigmatic developments has been the announcement
by PTCL of a major effort to establish such a backbone. Press reports of
the last year have reported the completion of the first phase of a large
Internet expansion project called the National Internet Backbone (NIBB).95
The objective is to provide a total of 300,000 new Internet connections,
with 50,000 becoming available by September/October 1999.
When asked about this project, the editor of the leading Internet maga-
zine in Pakistan (NetMag) replied, “You know how things work here in
Pakistan, we have heard that PTCL is putting something of that sort to-
gether but how and when it is going to do that is still a mystery to me
too.”96
While there does not exist a domestic backbone shared by multiple
ISPs, the aggregate capacity of the links between Karachi and Islamabad of
those ISPs with POPs in those cities is almost certainly more than 2 Mbps.
Internet Exchanges
There are currently no Internet exchange points in Pakistan. While the Internet
Service Providers Association of Pakistan has been serving as a forum for
such discussions, and plans for the creation of an Internet exchange point are
underway, these plans have not yet resulted in the creation of an IXP.
Access Methods
The access methods available to subscribers in Pakistan are shown in Table
29. As the table shows, subscribers who do not have a continuous con-
nection to an Internet service provider almost always use dial-up connec-
tions; high-speed Internet access is available in only very limited forms.
Modems up to 33.3 Kbps offer 22–25 Kbps access via Pakistani tele-
phone lines; 56 Kbps modems are of little additional benefit because the
quality of telephone lines is low, and the international lines of the ISPs
have such limited capacity that they are the bottleneck, rather than the
local loop. Furthermore, ISPs typically oversubscribe their networks.97
Companies in Pakistan also favor dial-up connections. In a survey con-
ducted in 1998, Shah found that 58 percent of companies responding used
dial-up connections; 28 percent used a 64 Kbps shared channel; 7 percent
used a 64 Kbps clear channel; and 7 percent leased a 256 Kbps clear chan-
nel.98 Although they have a low call completion rate and bandwidth effec-
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tively restricted to 32 Kbps, dial-up connections are found by most compa-
nies to be more cost effective than the alternatives. Overall, the bottleneck
in connecting to the Internet is not the local loop. Increasing bandwidth at
the user end is not likely to improve performance until the capacity of the
backbone increases. Only one ISP, Cybernet, offered ISDN access in 1999.99
Organizational Infrastructure
Regulatory Regime
The Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 continued
the monopoly over basic domestic and international telecommunications
services that had been put in place earlier. Internet service providers must
Table 29. Internet Access Methods in Pakistan
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obtain their domestic leased lines and the international half-circuit to a
foreign carrier from PTCL.
The government of Pakistan has deregulated and privatized the pro-
vision of certain telecommunications services and the manufacture of
certain telecommunications equipment. Table 30 lists the services, the
number of licensees, and related data, presumably as of early 1999. Of
the 45 licensees of data network services, 18 are providers of data net-
work services who are also licensed to offer Internet services, and 27 are
licensed as electronic information service providers.
The data network operation figures of Table 30 were obtained from
the PTCL and PTA webpages in October 1999. Aside from pointing out
that the PTCL has not done a good job of keeping its website updated, the
data also show the rapid growth in data network operation services,
especially within electronic information services/email (Internet services).
Although less than half of the companies granted licenses are offering
services, the 40 active ISPs (October 1999) have created a very competi-
Table 30.
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tive market. According to some industry observers, 150 licenses have been
granted, and 30 more are being processed.100
The ISP market has become highly competitive, fueled in no small
part by measures such as an ongoing ISP survey conducted by NetMag
magazine, one of the leading Internet-focused periodicals in Pakistan. This
survey (http://www.netmag.com.pk/) not only posts data regarding con-
nection prices and locations but also solicits input from readers regarding
the quality of the ISPs and tabulates and posts this information on its
website.
While the survey is certainly not scientific and, in all likelihood, does
not prevent ISPs from seeding the survey with positive comments about
themselves or negative comments about their competitors, the existence
of the survey indicates a heated competition among what is likely more
ISPs than the existing market can support.
Industry Associations
The Internet Service Providers Association of Pakistan (ISPAK) was founded
in 1998 to act “as a catalyst for opening newer and better avenues for
growth of Internet in Pakistan.”101 Its aims include:
• Present a united forum for presenting the issues and
points of view of the ISPs and their users to the Gov-
ernment, PTA and PTCL. For this purpose, ISPAK
will hold meetings to arrive at a consensus on differ-
ent issues.
• Present a joint forum for getting optimal pricing and
technical solutions from PTCL regarding domestic
leased fiber capacity, local dial-in lines, delivery of
International circuit and any other areas requiring
interface with PTCL.
• Co-operate in all technical, administrative and finan-
cial aspects to work towards creating local intercon-
nect between all the ISPs of the country. Currently,
any transaction of data that takes place between any
two ISPs is routed to the International service pro-
vider of the sender and then to that of the intended
recipient.
• Private Peering arrangements will be made in order
to provide for alternate routes in case of failures so
that the end users of the member ISPs do not suffer
because of individual link failures.
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• The ISPAK will come up with a complete plan for
implementing a true Pakistani Internet backbone in
the private sector. This will include the administra-
tion of the Pakistan TLD in Pakistan via a neutral
body.102
While these points and the others that appear in the organization’s
aims and objectives appear to be very sound and worthwhile, in the nearly
two years since it was created it is not clear that the organization has
come very close to achieving these goals. While it did play a significant
role in getting the charges for local phone access to ISPs changed, it has
clearly not been successful in establishing a national backbone or even
Internet exchange points between its members.
Organizational Infrastructure Rating
In light of the discussion above, we rate Pakistan at a Level 2 (Controlled)
on the organizational infrastructure dimension (see Table 31). While there
are more than a few ISPs at present, the monopoly control over domestic
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and international basic telecommunications services prevents the rating
from rising to a Level 3 (Competitive).
Sophistication of Use
A preliminary assessment of the sophistication of use by Pakistani organiza-
tions was undertaken during September 1999. Not a statistically robust sur-
vey, the study provides results that would have to be verified through a more
stringent methodology. Nevertheless, it may provide some baseline data.
The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority website contains links to
websites of more than 200 organizations. These organizations cover a broad
spectrum of sectors of the Pakistani economy. We grouped them into five
categories: health, education, government, commercial, and other. The
“other” category includes a number of nonprofit organizations with reli-
gious or national orientation. The websites of these organizations were evalu-
ated against the five levels of sophistication of use, shown in Table 32.
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Table 32 shows examples of uses of the Internet that would be typical
of a ranking at the level indicated. It is not necessary, however, for an
organization to exhibit all of the uses before being ranked in that cat-
egory. Indeed, one of the limitations of the survey is that all the informa-
tion is drawn from a company’s webpage. It is possible that there exist
companies with rather unsophisticated publicly accessible websites that
may make more sophisticated use of the Internet internally.
Figure 13 contains the results of the survey. By definition, there were
no Level 0 organizations included in the survey since such organizations
do not have websites. In most sectors, most organizations are at Level 1,
meaning that their websites are little more than an electronic “shingle”
providing the most basic information about the organization. Interest-
ingly, the education and government sectors appear to have fewer Level 1
organizations than Level 2 organizations. At Level 2, organizations are
providing more than basic identifying information. Often they are using














































































TurkPak.55-129 1/11/01, 2:13 PM82
83
the website as a mechanism for information dissemination. The fact that
education and government sectors have relatively more organizations in
this category than in Level 1 may reflect the fact that information dissemi-
nation is closer to their core mission than to that of the commercial and
health-care sectors. Alternatively, the commercial sector may be experi-
encing a rapid increase in the use of the Web. The high proportion of
companies with Level 1 sophistication of use may reflect a large number
of “newbies.” The educational and government organizations may sim-
ply have been using the Web for a longer period of time.
The small number of organizations at Level 3 sophistication of use
indicates that, among other things, electronic commerce (at least, the busi-
ness-to-customer variety) is not widely supported in Pakistan. Of the 12
organizations ranked at Level 3, one was a government institution (the
PTCL), one was an educational institution (the National College of Busi-
ness Administration & Economics, which has an online registration sys-
tem), two were from the “other” category, and eight were commercial
organizations. Of the latter, a number were ISPs. The other category of
most sophisticated users is the newspaper industry. The Business Recorder,
Pakistan’s national financial daily publication, uses the Internet not only
to disseminate news but also to sell classified advertisements. IMRAMM-
NEWS and Information Times boast online auctions, site search engines,
and so forth.
We did not find in this sample any companies at Level 4. Level 4
companies must be engaged in uses that are innovative, not just new to a
particular company or industry.
Overall, we place sophistication of use in Pakistan at a Level 2 in the
analytic framework. It is likely that the number of Level 3 organizations
will increase substantially in the near future. If electronic commerce be-
comes an accepted way of conducting business in Pakistan, the number
will grow dramatically. If electronic commerce does not, it will grow much
more slowly.
Voice over Internet is prohibited in Pakistan.103 While ISPs inform
their customers of this, they typically do not close the ports that enable
such transmission. Consequently, voice over Internet is popular.104 The
PTA has tried to enforce this restriction. During 1999, ZoooomNet and
AK Net were (temporarily) shut down for violations.105
Analytic Framework Dimensions
Figure 14 shows the growth of the Pakistani Internet along the six dimen-
sions. The extent and sophistication of Internet use continue to expand,
and the growth of the ISP market in recent years has been substantial.
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However, developments in the regulatory regimes and networking infra-
structure have been slower, which is likely to hinder more rapid develop-
ment in all dimensions. Organizational use, while growing, remains low.
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5. The Internet in Turkey and Pakistan:
A Comparison
The preceding chapters have traced the development of the Internet in Tur-
key and in Pakistan. This chapter highlights the similarities and differences
in the two countries’ Internet experiences and suggests an explanation by
applying the analytic framework developed in chapter 2.
The State of the Internet in Turkey and in Pakistan
Table 33 provides some comparative statistics of the Internet in the two
countries, and Figure 15 compares the Internet’s state along the dimen-
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sions of the analytic framework used in this study.  With each level repre-
senting a substantial increase over the next lower level, Figure 15 shows
that the Internet is considerably better developed in Turkey than in Paki-
stan along all dimensions, except for sophistication of use, where the two
countries rate at the same level. Although the two countries rate the same
in the sectoral absorption dimension, Turkey is a strong Level 2 about to
become a Level 3, while Pakistan is a weak Level 2. Turkey has five times
more Internet users (per capita); has much better access to the Internet—
in smaller cities and rural areas in particular; has a greater fraction of
commercial, government, educational, and health institutions using the
Internet; has much higher domestic and international bandwidth; and has
a somewhat more robust and liberalized regime offering basic telecom-
munications and Internet services to the ISPs and the user community.
While these differences are significant, substantial macro-similarities
exist as well, particularly in the dynamic of the Internet in recent years.
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First, both countries have seen dramatic increases in the number of indi-
viduals and organizations using the Internet. In the last two years of the
1990s, the user population increased 5–10 times in the two countries.
Second, in both countries the proliferation of ISPs began with great speed
following changes in policy and the regulatory framework that permitted
the creation and operation of private ISPs. Third, the underlying telecom-
munications and networking infrastructure supporting the Internet has
expanded dramatically in both extent and capacity. Fourth, in each coun-
try government policy-makers have been generally supportive of the
Internet, to the extent that they pay attention to it at all.
A comparison of the determinants of Internet diffusion of the ana-
lytic framework yields additional similarities and differences.
Determinants of Internet Diffusion
Access to the Internet
Access to the Internet (or to the Internet backbone for ISPs) is not possible
without communications lines of sufficient quality to carry a connection
(or a suitable wireless substitute), access to an Internet service provider
(or backbone), and the hardware and software necessary to establish the
connection.
Individual Access to the Internet
The vast majority of Internet users in Turkey and Pakistan access the
Internet over dial-up connections. Consequently, the extent of basic tele-
communications service is a significant determinant of the pool of poten-
tial users. Turkey here has a substantial edge over Pakistan. Not only is
the number of main lines per capita considerably greater in Turkey (24
percent) than in Pakistan (3 percent), but rural service is more widespread.
Since 1988, all Turkish villages and cities have had telephone service. Pa-
kistan is still reaching for this goal.
In both countries the areas in which Internet service is available have
expanded considerably. Although Turkish ISPs had, in 1999, POPs in fewer
than 20 cities, Türk Telekom has, since 1997, offered a special access
code (0822) for access to Internet service providers that has brought rea-
sonably priced Internet access to the entire country. In 1999, Pakistani
ISPs operated in 17–30 cities. However, users outside these cities have had
to pay hefty long-distance charges, making access in practice limited to
the larger urban centers.
A third component, access to personal computers, has improved in
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unable to afford them. In each country, dropping PC prices and a prolif-
eration of Internet cafés have dropped this barrier. In Turkey, some ISPs
are offering free hardware in exchange for a multiyear Internet access
contract. In Pakistan in 1998, the government removed all import duties
on personal computers, bringing the legal prices much more in line with
international prices.
ISP Access to the Internet Backbone
ISPs access the Internet through leased-line connections to a national back-
bone or via international lines to a global carrier. Of the two countries,
only Turkey has a national backbone. In cities housing a backbone node,
the barriers to ISPs have been low. While the number of such cities is
growing, ISPs’ ability to establish points of presence outside of these cities
has been limited by the cost and difficulty of acquiring the necessary leased
lines.
There is no Internet backbone in Pakistan, other than the lines that
individual ISPs lease from PTCL to carry their own traffic. To connect to
the global Internet, ISPs must lease rather pricey international circuits.
Getting such leased lines might not take place as quickly as some would
like, but the technical barriers are low, at least to the major cities. The
primary barriers to ISPs are financial.
In January 2000, PTCL floated a tender for the creation of two net-
work access points in Islamabad and Karachi through which it would be
able to block voice over IP traffic and pornography.106 For such monitor-
ing to work, all ISPs would have to route their international traffic through
one of these two points. While this policy has generated a great deal of
discussion, one possible benefit could be the creation of what amounts to
an Internet exchange point between Pakistani ISPs. No longer would inter-
ISP traffic have to travel outside of the country.
Cost of Internet Access
The cost of Internet access has a fundamental impact on market size and
ISPs’ ability to offer service profitably. Decreases in ISP access costs have
been a major factor fueling the expansion of the Internet in both Turkey
and Pakistan. Between 1997 and 1999, prices of basic leased connectivity
costs dropped in both countries, but by substantially more in Turkey (50-
90 percent) than in Pakistan (25-32 percent).107 These price reductions
enabled ISPs operating in highly competitive environments in both coun-
tries to reduce subscription fees.
Not only have costs been dropping more rapidly in Turkey, absolute
costs are lower there as well. Table 34 shows the cost of domestic and
international 1 Mbps connections to the Internet. These figures are illus-
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trative of cost differences in the two countries for a variety of basic tele-
communications services.
Table 34.













The connectivity cost is a major component of the costs that ISPs pass
along to subscribers in the form of subscription rates. Here also, Turkish
users enjoy substantially lower rates than their Pakistani counterparts. In
1998, ISPs were typically charging $40–50 per month for unlimited con-
nect time. A survey of ISPs conducted during the summer of 1999 showed
monthly connect fees ranging from $10 per month (with a two-year con-
tract) to $32 per month. The average monthly fee was approximately
$21. In contrast, most Internet service subscription fees in Pakistan were,
and continue to be, based on usage. In 1997, average ISP charges were
approximately $1.80 per hour during daytime hours and $0.80 per hour
for off-peak periods. In late 1999, the Internet service providers were com-
peting intensively on price, but a fixed rate for unlimited access was not
universal. Of the nearly 30 ISPs posting rates on the Web, nine offered
unlimited access at rates ranging Rs 1,500–2,500 per month ($30–48 per
month). All ISPs offered a variety of tariff packages based on hourly rates.
Hourly rates ranged Rs 20–65 per hour (approximately $0.38–$1.26 per
hour); the greater the number of hours in the “package” the lower the
hourly rate.
End users face additional costs that can greatly increase the cost of
Internet access. In both Pakistan and Turkey, local as well as long distance
calls are billed on a metered basis. Pakistani users face charges of nearly
$0.60 (including tax) per hour for local calls. While the cost of long-
distance calls has decreased, it is still prohibitive for most citizens consid-
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ering accessing the Internet from outside the major cities. In Turkey, the
0822 access code enables users to connect to their ISPs at rates that are
comparable to local calls, regardless of where they are in the country.
In both countries, telecommunications services are provided by the
national telecommunications provider (or, in the case of Turkey, a limited
number of licensed providers of international connectivity). Türk Telekom
and PTCL have been the target of privatization efforts by their govern-
ments for several years, and they have a strong interest in maintaining
healthy balance sheets. While each has dropped prices in recent years,
Türk Telekom has dropped prices farther and faster than PTCL. One pos-
sible reason for this difference could be the basic philosophies and relative
strengths of the two companies within the economic/political environ-
ment in their countries. Türk Telekom has a tradition of universal service
and development of new communications technologies. Although it is a
monopoly and its prices are not subject to market pressures as in a com-
petitive economy, pressure for price reductions has come through other
quarters. The drop in prices in 1998 was, in part, a result of such a recom-
mendation by the Internet Executive Council;108 it reflected a desire of
Türk Telekom’s parent ministry to encourage Internet growth. As usage
of the Internet in Turkey increases, the political pressure that can be brought
to bear by the public, the press, the ISPs, and the major investors in those
ISPs increases. In Pakistan, telephone service has been viewed not as a
basic necessity but as a luxury, and has had a tariff structure reflecting
this philosophy. Initial installation costs have been high. Local telephone
calls are metered. PTCL is a strong institution, under relatively less political
pressure to decrease prices, especially if reductions would have an impact
on its balance sheet that would hinder privatization efforts. In short, while
Türk Telekom has had a generally supportive attitude toward Internet ser-
vice providers and users, PTCL has been more antagonistic.
Ease of Use
The web browser was designed to be easy to use, and the experience of
millions of individuals throughout the world is that with minimal training
a literate individual can use the Internet for at least electronic mail and
Web surfing. Nevertheless, Turkey and Pakistan differ in the extent to
which even a browser interface presents a barrier.
Turkey has a high level of literacy (82 percent), so the technical de-
mands of Internet use are not a significant barrier. However, only a small
percentage of Turks can speak or read English. Consequently, the ability
of Turks to use the Internet productively is shaped in part by the amount
of interesting Turkish-language content. Fortunately, the volume of Internet
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content in Turkish is growing. Companies like SuperOnline have made a
priority of creating a “Turkish Internet” with content tailored to the Turk-
ish-speaking population.109 According to the Ministry of Transport and
Telecommunications Master Plan for Information Technology (TUENA),
in 1998 80 percent of webpages in Turkey were in Turkish.110
Pakistan has a much lower rate of literacy (35–45 percent). Of those
who can read, two-thirds read only Urdu and one-third can read English
(although most prefer Urdu).111
Perceived Value of the Internet
Individuals’, organizations’, and government policy-makers’ perceived
value of the Internet has a profound impact on the Internet’s develop-
ment. The net perceived value reflects a balance, or tension, between many
hopes, desires, imperatives, worries, and concerns. Without a net positive
perceived value, individuals and organizations are unlikely to embrace
the Internet; policy-makers are unlikely to promote and support it.
Although it is very difficult to quantify the perceived value within a
country, anecdotal evidence suggests that the popularity of the Internet
has grown dramatically in both Turkey and Pakistan in recent years. At
the same time, both countries have reasons to be concerned about the
impact of the Internet on domestic security and culture. Pornography, un-
Islamic information such as how to commit suicide, and proselytizing by
other religions are easily disseminated over the Internet. Terrorists and
antigovernment activists could use the Internet to organize their support-
ers, plan their activities, and carry out propaganda campaigns. Foreign
antagonists in Greece and India possibly could use the Internet for pur-
poses ranging from direct information dissemination to Turkish and Paki-
stani citizens to more destructive cyber attacks on prominent websites
and important computer installations. Each country has established me-
dia and commercial conglomerates that could also perceive the Internet as
a threat to their control over public opinion and the economy.
Examples of each of these uses of the Internet can be found. Groups
fighting for Kurdish, Kashmiri, and Cypriot interests have websites pro-
moting their viewpoints and providing a cyber presence for their causes.
The Insurgency Online Project at York University maintains a directory
of electronic oppositions at http://www.yorku.ca/research/ionline/
elop.html. Some of the insurgency organizations and their URLs are found
in Table 35.
The Internet may also play a role in planning protests or other activi-
ties. For example, following the arrest of Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan
in February 1999, Kurds organized protests in 20 European cities within
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Table 35. Internet Presence of Opposition Organizations Supporting
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two hours.112 While it is likely that broadcast media such as the Kurdish
television channel MED TV in London played a larger role than the Internet
in getting people into the streets, the Internet probably played a signifi-
cant role in organizing the demonstrations.
The Internet has also seen numerous examples of website defacement
supporting one cause or another. The Pakistan Hakerz Club, Gforce Paki-
stan, and m0s have been particularly active, defacing hundreds of websites
worldwide with pro-Kashmiri, anti-Indian statements.113 While examples
may be found, hacks by other groups with an interest in the conflicts of
Turkey or Pakistan are less numerous. The pro-Kurdish Kalamata hacked
the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its role in the Ocalan arrest; Stone-
henge Crew has touted Greek superiority on a number of (non-Turkish)
sites. These and other examples of defaced webpages may be found on the
websites of http://www.attrition.org and http://www.projectgamma.com,
which track defacings throughout the world.
While concerns over the Internet have surfaced in both Turkey and
Pakistan, in neither country have these concerns coalesced (so far) into a
force that has significantly impeded or altered the development of the
Internet. On the contrary, it appears that whatever barriers have been
put in place (or, at least, not removed) have centered on economic is-
sues, such as the desire to maintain the well-being of the national tele-
communications provider. At present, the balance of interests in Turkey
and Pakistan tend rather strongly toward favoring the expansion of the
Internet. However, the basic reality is that the vast majority of citizens
and politicians do not interact with the Internet regularly and do not
view it as a priority item.
Individuals’ Perceived Value of the Internet
Why are individuals in Turkey and Pakistan drawn to the Internet? While
no formal surveys have been conducted, individuals intimately involved
with Internet cafés, ISPs, and other facets of Internet use in Turkey sug-
gest that chat and pornography are two of the dominant uses. One of the
most popular applications of the Internet in Pakistan is Internet chat.
According to one source, nearly 90 percent of Pakistani users consider
using Internet chat to be their primary motivation for using the Internet.114
In both countries, the Internet has become an important source of infor-
mation for expatriate communities about their home countries. The Internet
played a particularly important role in this regard during the October
1999 coup. Reportedly, on October 13, 1999, the website of Dawn, a
leading Pakistani periodical, was accessed by nearly 124,000 distinct in-
dividuals. In contrast, only 75,000 accessed the website 18 months earlier
during the nuclear tests.115
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While the Internet has become fashionable within certain segments of
both the Pakistani and the Turkish populations, for the vast majority of
each country’s population the Internet remains of little concern. Given the
state of the two countries’ economies, most individuals are much more
concerned with the day-to-day issues of making a living and providing for
their families.
At the same time, the ISPs and companies like banks are working very
hard, particularly in Turkey, to increase the perceived value of the Internet
by exploring new content and services. For example, one of SuperOnline’s
major strategies at the moment is to create Turkish content that will make
the Internet a part of the daily life of individuals. The content includes
local travel, cinema, news, and investment features. SuperOnline supports
an investment simulation game in which users can track the progress of
fictitious portfolios against actual stock prices.116 Garanti Bank took the
unusual step of establishing its own Internet service provider operation to
offer lower ISP subscription rates to its account holders.117
Organizations’ Perceived Value of the Internet
Among organizational users, the perceived value varies from sector to sector.
In the Turkish commercial sector, interest in the World Wide Web and elec-
tronic commerce is growing rapidly. One ISP reports that the web-hosting
business is growing by 25 percent per year.118 As the number of companies
using the Internet grows, Internet use increasingly becomes an obligatory
accessory, even if the company has not examined in detail the most appropri-
ate use of the medium. Here also, the Internet has become fashionable.
While overall awareness of the Internet among Pakistani organizations
is probably low, awareness is being heightened through the marketing ef-
forts of individual ISPs, and through events such as national IT summits
and international conferences. On October 16–17, 1999, an international
conference on “E-Commerce: Preparing for the Challenges” was orga-
nized in Karachi.119
Policy-Makers’ Perceived Value of the Internet
How is the Internet perceived from the perspective of government entities
that are responsible for such matters as government administration, policy-
making, or national security? Both countries are characterized by govern-
ments that are, on the whole, rather disinterested in or ignorant of the
Internet, but which have strong support for the telecommunications infra-
structure and pockets of serious interest (including high-level ones) in the
Internet itself.
While there are groups in Turkey examining various aspects of elec-
tronic commerce, including privacy and security matters, the Turkish par-
liament has not passed legislation that deals specifically with the Internet.
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Whether by default or design or both, the current approach is to cope
with Internet-related issues as much as possible within the context of ex-
isting laws. For example, only Internet cafés that serve alcohol are to be
prohibited in proximity to mosques. The publication of pornography on
the Internet is illegal not because there is a law specifically against Internet
pornography, but because the law already limits the sale of pornographic
material in print.
Politically, the Internet is not a significant issue in Turkey and is not
viewed as a major factor shaping public opinion. Turkish public opinion
is strongly shaped by the handful of corporations that own the principal
media outlets. Although these companies are also investing substantial
funds in developing a presence on the Internet, the sense among politi-
cians is that the Internet is not a threat as an alternative information source.
As one individual put it, “No one is going to start a revolution via email.”
While this sentiment may change with a growing Internet user popula-
tion, the Internet and, in particular, the negative aspects of the Internet
have relatively low visibility.
In the national security area, three major viewpoints seem to be at
work: First, telecommunications is viewed as a means of enhancing na-
tional security. Second, the Internet has some qualities that affect national
security negatively. Third, one should control what one can but not try
too hard to control what one can’t. When the Internet first began to take
root in Turkey, the national security community, aware of some of the
possible uses of the network for terrorist and other socially harmful ac-
tivities, investigated whether it should, or could, control its development
and use. At one point the Interior Ministry tried to shut down Internet
cafés because of the potential for users to access information on pornog-
raphy, terrorist propaganda and expertise (like building bombs), and drug
dealing. A small number of members of the Turkish parliament, perhaps
10 out of 550, were promoting the idea of creating a closed Turkish
Internet, with strict controls over the flow of information to and from the
international Internet. In the end, such measures lacked public support
and the support of key individuals in the Ministry of Transport and Tele-
communications; the Council of National Security realized that it did not
have the human resources necessary. The national security community
decided to let the Internet flourish with intervention only when necessary
to enforce existing laws.
Discussions on the extent to which the Internet might be controlled
continue, however. A draft bill, “Bill on the National Information Security
Organization and Its Duties,” was crafted by the Ministry of Defense. The
bill would create a supervisory committee dominated by the national secu-
rity community and obligate any Internet-related company to turn over to
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the national security community any information it demands, including
email, at any level of security requested. There is no mention in the bill of
gateways, filters, or other related technologies.120 In some respects, these
measures are an extension of existing prohibitions regulating journalistic
treatment of subjects such as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). How-
ever, the language of the bill is loose enough that some observers fear it
gives the national security community the freedom to pursue broader forms
of censorship and monitoring of the population. This bill appears to have
stalled out in the legislative process and is undergoing revision.
In Pakistan, interest in promoting the Internet was moderate to high
at the highest levels of government. Faroq Leghari, president of Pakistan
through 1997, was personally interested in information technology is-
sues, including the Internet, and he appointed a presidential commission
to study the issue in the mid-1990s. His successor, President Muhammad
Rafiq Tarar, was not as interested, but the former prime minister,
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, and other ministers continued to support the
Internet’s expansion.121 In a statement made on Communications Tech-
nology Day (June 12, 1999), Sharif underscored his view of the impor-
tance of the communications infrastructure:
I envision Pakistan as a country where an overall progress
will be doubly enhanced with effective and modern means
of communications. We already have made great advances
in roads by spreading a network of Motorways in the
country supported with a modern and reliable telecom-
munication network. The Ports & Shipping day and night
are serving the economic needs of the country. Today and
tomorrow’s progress hinges on the E-Commerce and In-
formation Technology.122
While concerns about pornography and other socially objectionable
content exist, the Pakistani government has not actively tried to control
access to content.123
Strong telecommunications has been seen as a necessary condition
for a strong software export and IT industry, which in turn has consis-
tently been a priority of the Pakistani government. We have mentioned a
variety of measures, including tariff reduction on leased lines, that favor
companies involved in such industries.
Telecommunications Providers’ Perceived Value of the Internet
Until 1995, Türk Telekom and the Ministry of Transport and Telecom-
munications paid little attention to the Internet. Although it has some-
times been viewed as a barrier to the growth of the Internet in Turkey,
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there is little question that Türk Telekom is eager to see an expansion of
the Internet in Turkey and is even willing to tolerate some inconsistencies
between the law and existing practice to see it thrive. Certainly Türk
Telekom does not have the kind of hostile relationship with users and
Internet service providers that other countries’ monopolies have.
The perceived value of the Internet by PTCL must be inferred from
its actions. Overall, PTCL appears to view the Internet as an encroach-
ment on its traditional activities, rather than as an opportunity to be
embraced. This attitude arises from at least four quarters. First, the tele-
communications acts of the 1990s establish PTCL as the exclusive pro-
vider of basic telecommunications services to nongovernmental entities
within Pakistan. Although the Internet is not considered a basic service,
some aspects of Internet use—voice over Internet in particular—are, and
are points of direct contention between the PTCL and the ISPs. Second,
PTCL behaves toward its customer base in a manner typical of monopo-
lies throughout the world. It is sluggish, has a poor attitude toward
customer service, and is not quick to embrace change. Third, PTCL is
undergoing a protracted effort to privatize the corporation. Fourth, PTCL
has had a strong interest in building the infrastructure necessary to sup-
port provision of basic services. These investments are seen both as a
means of improving the company’s position in the eyes of foreign inves-
tors and as a necessary condition for the support of Pakistan’s software
industry.
There have been reports that the PTCL will establish two national
access points (NAP) in Karachi and Islamabad through which to monitor
Internet traffic for voice over IP traffic, which is prohibited.124 While the
motive is, ostensibly, to identify and block voice over IP and pornogra-
phy, there is no technical reason why the gateways could not filter other
kinds of traffic.
Resources
The resources needed to expand Internet use at the organizational, local,
and national levels fall into five broad categories: financial, informational,
human, technological or capital, and material.
Technological Resources
Technological resources are, in the case of the Internet, the hardware and
software components that constitute the infrastructure: routers, cables,
switches, and so forth with the software to make it function. The availability
of the necessary hardware and software is not a limiting factor in either Tur-
key or Pakistan. ISPs in both countries use technology purchased from well-
known vendors like Cisco Systems, Sun Microsystems, and many others.
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Human Resources
In contrast, the scarcity of human resources is a limiting factor in both
Turkey and Pakistan. Shortages are found everywhere, from commercial
companies seeking to establish websites and get involved with electronic
commerce to the national telecommunications companies’ working to hire
network-savvy employees to schools trying to connect to the Internet.
Government organizations are particularly disadvantaged because they
are legally limited in the amount of money (inadequate) that they can pay
employees. The lack of adequate human resources has been cited by sev-
eral leading proponents of the Internet as the most critical problem limit-
ing growth of the Internet in Turkey.125 In Pakistan, the IT industry as a
whole suffers from a shortage of skilled IT professionals. According to
Hassan, this state of affairs is a result not only of a failure of government
to provide sufficient education (since most technical institutions are run
by the government) but also of a lack of interest and understanding by the
private sector.126 Furthermore, due to the rapid growth of demand for
skilled IT professionals in other countries, the United States in particular,
experienced IT professionals are migrating away from Pakistan.127 Tur-
key, in contrast, has not experienced a significant “Brain Drain.” Turkish
students studying abroad usually return to Turkey to live.
Informational Resources
Informational resources consist largely of the documentation relevant to
all the tasks that are part of building and maintaining an infrastructure.
Increasingly available on the Internet or from vendors, necessary infor-
mation regarding Internet technologies is not lacking and thus is not a
major issue.
Financial Resources
Financial resources may come through government allocations, domestic
private investment, or foreign investment. “Fluidity of resources” refers
to the ease with which resources can flow from where they are to where
they are needed.
Both Turkey and Pakistan have invested substantially in the expan-
sion of the telecommunications infrastructure. However, each country is
burdened by federal debt and a negative balance of payments that redi-
rects much of the telecommunications providers’ revenue to the general
budget. In spite of efforts to attract foreign capital, neither country enjoys
high levels of foreign investment.
One of the principal sources of financial resources for Internet-related
development throughout the world is private capital, including venture capi-
tal and foreign investment. Both sources are in short supply in Turkey.
Because of high rates of inflation and high levels of national debt, the
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government pays high rates of interest on securities to attract investment.
This investment opportunity decreases the attractiveness of riskier startup
ventures. Organizations that do have a great deal of money, such as the
major Turkish holding companies, prefer to create their own companies
rather than invest in other companies.
Although Turkey’s foreign investment policies have created a stream-
lined, transparent foreign investment climate, among the most liberal within
the OECD nations, foreign investment remains relatively scarce in Tur-
key.128 However, investments are subject to the political uncertainties,
bureaucratic red tape, and occasionally unclear legal environment of Tur-
key. In the telecommunications arena, the government is trying to sell
Türk Telekom to a strategic partner, but the uncertain investment and
regulatory climate in Turkey makes this very difficult.129
In Pakistan, the poor economic climate has had a strong negative
impact. The suffering financial sector is burdened with many non-
performing loans. Reduced business activity has dragged down PTCL rev-
enues. Economic downturns have resulted in lower tariff and taxes revenue
than would otherwise be the case.
The demographics of Pakistani industry may also play a role. Ac-
cording to Hassan, most businesses are jointly owned by families but
managed individually. As families grow, they spin off new business units
to give to the younger generation rather than allowing businesses to grow.
Pakistani laws have, to an extent, favored small firms over large. As a
consequence, most companies are not large enough to be able to afford
significant, long-term investment in information technologies.130
Since the late 1980s, Pakistan has taken great strides to improve the
climate for foreign investment, at least on paper. Pakistan’s legal frame-
work does not discriminate against foreign investors. The Foreign Private
Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act, 1976 states explicitly that
foreign investment shall not be subject to more taxation on income than
investment made in similar circumstances by Pakistani citizens. Prior to
1997, however, direct foreign investment was limited to the manufactur-
ing sector. A new investment policy, announced in November 1997, opened
the agriculture, services, infrastructure, and social sectors to foreign invest-
ment as well. In addition, particular benefits were given to investments in
valued-added or export industries, high technology, priority industries,
and agro-based industries.131 In spite of these legal benefits, however, for-
eign investment in Pakistan has been relatively low. Total foreign private
direct investment reached a high-water mark in 1995–1996 with $1.1
billion. This figure dropped to $699 million in 1996–1997 and to $547
million for the 10 months July 1997–April 1998.132 Possible reasons in-
clude inadequate infrastructure, perceptions of political instability, law
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and order difficulties, policy inconsistencies, resistance to the open eco-
nomic environment by bureaucrats, the lack of effective protection of
intellectual property rights, and endemic corruption.133 Another factor
inhibiting investment in Pakistan is the lack of a legal and fiscal frame-
work for the creation of venture capital funds.134 Following Pakistan’s
nuclear tests in May 1998, foreign investors withdrew $175 million.135
Material Resources
One of the few material resources on which the Internet depends is electrical
power. In many countries, including Turkey, electrical power is sufficiently
stable and universally available that it ceases to be an issue. This is not the
case in Pakistan. In 1997, only 31 percent of households had electricity.136
Legal and Regulatory Framework
IP Address and Domain Name Allocation
Although many aspects of the Internet are inherently distributed, the whole
system depends on coordinated approaches to assigning Internet Protocol
(IP) addresses and domain names, and managing the association between
the two. Both Turkey and Pakistan have the necessary mechanisms for
allocating IP addresses and domain names. In Turkey, the Middle East
Technical University (METU) was given responsibility for Turkey’s domain
name service (DNS), including the responsibility of allocating domain names
under the .tr domain. It continues to maintain the DNS. Allocation of IP
addresses is somewhat less coordinated but has taken place in a manner
that has been free of serious difficulty. METU does allocate some IP ad-
dresses, but in principle any organization is free to obtain an IP address
directly from Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE) or any other comparable au-
thority. ISPs have been given blocks of IP addresses over which they have
responsibility.
Since 1992, before the first Internet connection to Pakistan was es-
tablished, the Pakistan Network Information Center (PKNIC) has had
responsibility for the maintenance and administration of the registry ser-
vice for .pk domains. The organization is also responsible for the technical
operation and maintenance of the root services for the .pk DNS.137 PKNIC
does not provide IP address allocations. These are provided by ISPs or di-
rectly to an organization through the Internet Network Information Center
(INTERNIC) or Asia-Pacific Network Information Center (APNIC).
Provision of Telecommunications Services
The Turkish constitution mandates that the Turkish government alone
provide basic communications services. Consequently, most wireline and
a good deal of wireless infrastructure is created by Türk Telekom. While
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Türk Telekom has licensed a small number of companies (which compete
against each other) to provide international satellite connectivity, domes-
tic telephone and leased-line services are provided exclusively by this
monopoly provider.
However, companies are permitted to build infrastructure for their
own use. SuperOnline is one ISP that has been building its own infrastruc-
ture. By the end of 1999, it had planned to have ATM capacity into over
19 nodes.138
The Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 estab-
lished that the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority should be the au-
thority regulating telecommunications services in Pakistan. This body was
required by the act to provide a license for basic telecommunications ser-
vices to the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited and the Na-
tional Telecommunication Corporation. Individual citizens and private
sector companies, including ISPs, must rely on PTCL for the leased, data,
and dial-up lines on which the Internet depends.
Licensing of ISPs
The licensing of ISPs is, legally speaking, a large gray area in Turkey.
While some countries use the lack of a firmly established legal framework
as a tool to inhibit ISP proliferation, Turkey has taken the opposite ap-
proach. The Turkish government has encouraged the proliferation of ISPs
under these uncertain conditions, preferring to overlook inconsistencies
or irregularities in the legal framework for the sake of promoting a vigor-
ous ISP market. While it is likely that some sort of licensing arrangement
will be established, currently no ISPs are formally licensed.
The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority is the licensing authority
for Internet services. Two kinds of companies could (in 1997) offer Internet
service. Companies that already had a license to operate a data network
were permitted to offer Internet service as well. In addition, companies
wanting to offer only Internet access could obtain an Electronic Informa-
tion Service license.139
Internet-Specific Legislation
Neither Turkey nor Pakistan has been particularly active in developing
Internet-specific legislation. To date, Turkey has not established a frame-
work of “cyber law” oriented toward the Internet. In part, this is a reflec-
tion of the relatively low priority that the Internet has on the agenda of
the Turkish parliament and the rather chaotic state of that body. The most
generous rationalization is that Turkey is taking a conservative approach,
watching cyber law developments in other countries, and planning its le-
gal moves carefully. A less generous interpretation is that the country can’t
pass controversial legislation.
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During August 1999, an IT Summit was held in Pakistan, presided
over by President Muhammad Rafique Tarar. A working group recom-
mended that new legislation on freedom of information at the federal and
provincial levels be passed as a top priority to enable “e-government” and
good governance.140
Ability to Execute
The ability to execute reflects an ability to develop a sound strategy and a
suitable design given the opportunities and constraints, as well as the abil-
ity to manage plans through to completion. The ability to execute may be
compromised by political infighting or instability, red tape, historical
legacies (e.g., existing but inadequate infrastructure or legacy hardware/
software systems), or simply a mismatch between the scope of the project
and the organizations’ expertise. With respect to the Internet, we are
particularly interested in the ability to execute of three kinds of players:
telecommunications service providers, the government, and ISPs. Neither
country has exhibited a strong ability to get things done. Both governments
in particular rate low on this determinant, but Pakistan’s government has
been especially dismal.
Telecommunications Services Providers
Türk Telekom’s ability to execute must be rated as Moderate. While the
projects that it has undertaken have been generally successful, the company
has frequently had difficulty carrying out the project in a timely fashion. A
number of factors diminish Türk Telekom’s ability to execute: the generally
chaotic state of the Turkish government makes continuity of management
and vision difficult; the wage ceilings limit Türk Telekom’s ability to hire
and retain skilled individuals; and, as a state monopoly, Türk Telekom is
highly bureaucratic, with a lax attitude toward customer service.141
PTCL’s ability to execute also appears to be Moderate. While custom-
ers of PTCL experience many of the same difficulties dealing with the
companies as do customers of monopoly PTTs in other countries, PTCL
has made steady progress in expanding its infrastructure and services.
Government
The Turkish government is not a model of efficiency. Political parties in
continuous flux, a host of powerful special interests, and an entrenched
bureaucracy make the organization and execution of new initiatives diffi-
cult. The interaction of these forces pushes public policy in directions that
can often not be predicted.
There are bright spots in the formulation of Internet-related policy in
Turkey. The Internet Executive Council (IEC), which met for the first time
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in January 1998, provides a forum in which all the leading Internet-re-
lated voices can discuss and work through difficult issues affecting them
all. The IEC has membership from government ministries, commercial
organizations, and academia. Reports are that discussion is substantial,
open, and effective. The IEC has made recommendations that have been
acted on and had a positive impact on the Turkish Internet.
Another positive measure taken by the government is the develop-
ment of TUENA, the Turkish Information Master Plan. The effort to
formulate a master plan was carried out by the TUENA project office,
established in 1997 within TÜBITAK under the coordination and re-
sponsibility of the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications. “The
basic vision is to maximize social and economic benefits of the informa-
tion infrastructure, while optimising local value-added by informatics
industries including telecommunication and informatics equipment manu-
facturers, software and communication service industries and content
industries with a view to raise their global competitiveness in order to
capture a bigger share of the world informatics market and to become
an important regional actor.”142
The introduction to the Pakistan 2010 Programme makes a telling
commentary on Pakistan’s general ability to execute:
To achieve [the goals of the Programme] requires a
broader definition of development not as “catching up”
(which focuses almost exclusively on physical capital),
but as “making things work” with a primary, though
not exclusive, emphasis on social and human capital.
Pakistan remained under developed not because the en-
dowment of physical capital was low, but because we
had a low capacity to operate and maintain that capital
effectively; not for want of institutions, but by a dearth
of standards of behavior that enable institutions [to] per-
form  effectively; not because we did not have sound poli-
cies, but because we lacked the ability to implement those
policies effectively; not for want of laws, but because of
the absence of norms of conduct that prevent the misuse
of laws.143
In light of this general difficulty with “making things work,” the Pa-
kistan Programme 2010 placed a good deal of emphasis on establishing
good governance. The Sharif government did little, however, to establish
“good governance.”
Economic management in Pakistan has been characterized by insta-
bility and corruption. By some estimates, 30–40 percent of the original
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cost of projects ends up in the pockets of contractors and officials in the
shape of kickbacks and commissions.144 While the October 1999 coup
illustrated that the Sharif government had not succeeded in reversing these
qualities, Sharif did, at some level, recognize the problem. “In the past,
governments introduced minute and unanticipated changes in tax and
tariff rates, exemptions, controlled prices, or credit variables, frequently
and at will. The result was that on the one hand the unpredictability dis-
couraged long term investment, and on the other hand the policy stance
encouraged diversion of private sector resources into lobbying and influ-
ence peddling.”145
Internet Service Providers
As in any open market with many players and relatively low barriers to
entry, the ability of Turkish ISPs to formulate and execute a successful
business plan covers the spectrum from very good to dismal. Since
TURNET was established, many ISPs have been created and have experi-
mented with a variety of business plans ranging from the full-service pro-
vider model to a highly niche-oriented one. Some ISPs have failed, some
have been purchased by other ISPs, and some have succeeded. What is
important is not that any particular ISP has or has not an ability to ex-
ecute, but that collectively the ISP market has enough dynamic and ro-
bustness that some ISPs will be able to take advantage of any market
opportunity that presents itself. Overall, the Turkish ISP market has a
rather strong ability to execute.
In Pakistan, the number of ISPs has grown significantly in recent years,
and many of them have succeeded in expanding service beyond one or
two cities. One reason to question their ability to execute is the lack of
peering agreements or an Internet exchange point among ISPs. The Internet
Service Providers Association of Pakistan was formed in part to facilitate
the creation of such an IXP or peering arrangements but has apparently
been unsuccessful. It is not clear to what extent the fault lies with the ISPs
themselves or with factors beyond the ISPs’ control.
Geography
Turkey is a country of modest size, with a well-proportioned, integrated
landmass. While parts of the country are hot, dry, and barren, the terrain
does not pose any unusual costs or difficulties to the establishment of
infrastructure.
The Indus River runs from north to south nearly the entire length of
Pakistan. Within its river valley lie most of the people, power, and, corre-
spondingly, telecommunications infrastructure. The ISPs also have their
POPs within the major cities of this valley. In contrast, the rest of Paki-
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stan, to the west and to the northeast, is filled with inhospitable moun-
tains or desert plateaus.
Demand for Capacity
Since TURNET was established, there has always been greater demand
for capacity, especially international capacity, than supply. Demand pull
has been a constant force for greater expansion of the Internet in Turkey.
The E3 (34 Mbps) lines connecting TTNet to the outside world were satu-
rated almost as soon as they went into service.
The current bottleneck of the Pakistani Internet is not the local loop
but the domestic and international leased circuits that connect an ISP’s
POPs or connect it to the global Internet. Currently, demand on these
circuits exceeds capacity.146
Culture of Entrepreneurship
While the Internet service provider market is quite dynamic, there are so
far very few examples in Turkey of Internet-related activities that are in-
volved in the creation of distinctly new products or services reflecting
strong innovative activity. One possible explanation for this is what ap-
pears to be a rather low culture of entrepreneurship. In countries like the
United States and Israel, startup companies abound, following a now-
familiar life cycle: The founding individuals develop a bright idea, create
a rudimentary product, attract venture capital, establish a company to
commercialize the product, sell the company or hold an initial public of-
fering (IPO), repeat the process. The wild success stories inspire many to
look for, and develop, new, exciting ideas.
In Turkey the startup life cycle typically gets short-circuited. First,
there are very few success stories along these lines in Turkey, so a young
person sees little in his or her experience to inspire him/her to start a new
company. Second, some have indicated that as a whole Turks do not have
a risk-taking mentality in which failure is an acceptable outcome. Third,
there is little venture capital to fund startups. Given the inflation rate and
the enormous debt the Turkish government carries, the interest rates on
government securities are quite high. Money in Turkey is more likely to
be attracted to well-paying, safe investments than to highly speculative
ventures. Fourth, it is virtually impossible to survive as a software com-
pany in Turkey. Software piracy is rampant.
According to Hassan, the Pakistani economy is characterized by
many, many, small family-owned companies, and policies favor small
businesses.147 As a result, a greater percentage of the Pakistani people
are likely to have experience managing their own businesses than in
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other countries with comparable demographics. The proliferation of ISPs
reflects no shortage of individuals and organizations willing to enter a
new market. However, the financial structures needed to support a truly
vibrant entrepreneurial culture, venture capital markets in particular,
appear to be lacking.148
Forces for Change
While much of the motivation for change in Internet development and use
may come from high perceived value of the medium, some motivation comes
from external forces for change. While the two—perceived value and forces
for change—are closely related, it is nevertheless helpful to identify some of
the principal forces or agents that are playing a role in driving the develop-
ment of the Internet in Turkey and in Pakistan. Such forces can be catego-
rized into agents of change, competitive forces, and external mandates.
Agents of Change
One of the changes in the Internet landscape in Turkey is the growing num-
ber of individuals and organizations who are actively promoting the Internet.
Among the most persistent proponents have been academics such as Mustafa
Akgül at Bilkent University and Atilla Özgit at Middle East Technical Uni-
versity, who were driving forces not only for the establishment of the Internet
in Turkey but also for its promotion in the years since.
Within the government, A. Tahir Dengiz, deputy undersecretary of
the Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications, has been the leading
activist. An avid Internet user, he has been the force behind the creation of
the Internet Executive Committee and many of the initiatives the ministry
has taken with respect to the Internet.
Among commercial entities, the principal drivers of changes are the
Internet service providers. Seeking to expand their markets, ISPs are vig-
orously promoting the Internet through any means they can think of.
Turkish banks in particular see opportunities in the electronic com-
merce arena and have organized programs to educate businesses about
the value of e-commerce and the steps they might take to conduct busi-
ness on the Internet.149 Banks’ efforts to reduce their costs and improve
their quality of service and profitability by encouraging Internet banking
have been discussed earlier.
Some holding companies and media groups, attracted by the atten-
tion the Internet has received elsewhere in the world, are beginning to
push change through financial levers.
In contrast, the agents of change in Pakistan are less evident and less
effective. Unlike in Turkey, in Pakistan the academic community had very
TurkPak.55-129 1/11/01, 2:14 PM106
107
little involvement with the creation of the first nodes and continues to
play a very minor role.
While the Information Technology Commission in Pakistan was cre-
ated in 1997 with high expectations, its website, www.itcomm.gov.pk, is
not inspiring. The following quote illustrates a good intention:
Information Technology is the fastest growing area in
today’s world and the Government of Pakistan has pri-
oritized its energy and resources towards ensuring that
the Government is fully equipped with all the relevant IT
tools required to enter the 21st Century. This web site
has been developed in the same spirit.150
However, the website does not appear to have been significantly up-
dated or added to since its creation. There are few indications of any
concrete results of the commission’s efforts. According to one source, the
IT Commission has been renamed the IT Working Group and is currently
based at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, a victim of the
frequent changes in the ruling party.151
Competitive Forces
Since the 1980s Turkey has taken many steps to open its economy and
make it more competitive. While certainly the number of organizations
viewing the Internet as a key component of a competitive strategy is still
small, it is growing. Among the noncommercial sectors of society, how-
ever, competitive forces are not strongly felt.
Under the current economic climate in Pakistan, the use of the Internet
as a point of competitive advantage makes little sense for most businesses,
except, perhaps, those in the software business. The vast majority of the
Pakistani populace is unfamiliar with the Internet. Given the current po-
litical and economic climate in Pakistan, most organizations probably have
greater concerns than how the Internet might assist their marketing ef-
forts. However, for those organizations that have dealings with the global
community, the Internet is much more likely to be an essential business
tool.
External Mandates
At present, there are few formal mandates, government or otherwise, push-
ing the use of the Internet in Turkey or in Pakistan. At the provincial level
in Pakistan, Sind and Punjab provinces have programs to bring all provin-
cial government agencies online.
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Enablers of Change
Enablers of change are those elements that help a change take hold in
a community. While forces for change push change into a community,
the enablers of change are those conditions that enable a community
to embrace the change and that affect that rate of change. One of the
more significant enablers includes what Nelson calls the “National In-
novation Systems,” which encompasses the educational system and or-
ganizations involved in research and development.152 Other factors may
include historical strengths (e.g., Israeli expertise in security issues),
the legal framework for creating of new companies, and cultural ele-
ments that may influence a society’s willingness to embrace new tech-
nologies. Neither Turkey nor Pakistan has particularly strong enablers
of change.
In Turkey, the educational system is good, but it is not producing
enough technically skilled graduates. Turkey has few inherent technol-
ogy strengths. While creating a new company is not difficult, compa-
nies of all kinds may struggle at times with bureaucracy and political
change. The Turkish people are very social and are quick to embrace
technologies that support social interaction. Overall, Turkey may be
compared, perhaps, to soil that is suitable for farming but not as fer-
tile as some.
In Pakistan, the educational system has pockets of excellence (e.g.,
Lahore University of Management Science—LUMS) but lacks the breadth
and depth to produce the quality and volume of graduates needed for
broad-based adoption of the Internet. Pakistan has few inherent technol-
ogy strengths, although the software industry has been growing. While
creating a new company is not difficult, struggles with bureaucracy and
political change are a constant part of the landscape.
Government Policy and the Determinants
of Internet Diffusion
Table 36 compares some of the ways in which Turkish and Pakistani gov-
ernments have promoted the Internet through a positive influence on the
determinants discussed above.
The table underscores the contention that neither country’s govern-
ment has been completely inactive or hostile with regard to matters af-
fecting the Internet. Key investments in communications infrastructure
and the opening of the Internet services market to private companies rank
high among their positive contributions.
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Table 36. Measures Taken by Turkish and Pakistani Governments
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Internet Diffusion Determinants in Comparison
Table 37 summarizes in rough form this chapter’s discussion. A check mark
indicates which country has a stronger rating in the determinant indicated.
When neither country has a large advantage with respect to the other, no
check mark is given. While there are a number of determinants in which
neither country has an advantage relative to the other, such as perceived value,
demand, and culture of entrepreneurship, there is no determinant in which
Pakistan rates stronger than Turkey. Consequently, it should come as little
surprise that the state of the Internet is stronger in Turkey than in Pakistan.
Table 37. Relative Advantage in Determinants between Turkey
and Pakistan
stnanimreteD
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eulaVdeviecreP X X X X X X
tenretnIehtfoesUfoesaE X X X X
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6. Conclusions
The preceding chapters have tried to capture the details and general fea-
tures of the development of the Internet in two countries that, while not
closely related historically, have significant cultural, political, economic,
and technical parallels. Turkey and Pakistan’s Internet experiences have
considerable commonality, yet significant differences, making them use-
ful cases for exploring the complex set of factors that promote and inhibit
the spread of this technology. While a study of two countries cannot eas-
ily prove causal relationships, it does suggest factors that correlate, which
should be the subject of further research on other countries’ Internet ex-
periences.
The Internet: Considerable Similarities
The most significant shared characteristic of the Internet in the two coun-
tries is that, as in many countries throughout the world, the Internet has
grown dramatically within the last half decade. Turkey’s over two million
users and Pakistan’s 500,000–700,000 users (both figures mid-2000) re-
flect an order of magnitude increase in user population in just three years.
Supporting and encouraging this growth has been a highly competitive
and expanding community of commercial Internet service providers of-
fering steadily improving service and pricing. These, in turn, have ben-
efited from long-term efforts to expand and improve the national tele-
communications systems through the laying of fiber-optic cable, digital
switches, and multiple times more main lines. While not as dramatic, the
Internet’s absorption into various sectors of the nations’ economies (health,
education, commercial, government) is evident, as is a growing sophisti-
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cation of use by these organizations as electronic commerce and other
uses grow in prevalence and popularity.
The similarities are not uniformly positive, however. The vast major-
ity of each country’s population has never experienced the Internet. Only
in 1999 did the fraction of Turkey’s population that used the Internet
cross the 1 percent threshold. By the end of 1999, less than one-half of 1
percent of Pakistan’s population used the Internet. The aggregate costs of
Internet service, telephone service, and PC purchase or lease are
unaffordable to most. The fraction of organizations using the Internet
also is small, particularly in the health-care and government sectors. Nei-
ther country has laws or financial vehicles that are particularly well posi-
tioned to support electronic commerce. The highly dynamic and volatile
phenomenon of “dot-com” startups, which has captivated investors in
the United States and Europe in recent years, is hardly seen in Turkey and
Pakistan. Each country suffers from domestic and international infrastruc-
tures that regularly are fully saturated with Internet traffic. Capacity is
expanding more slowly and with more problems than users would like.
The Internet: Significant Differences
At the same time, the state of the Internet is in many respects significantly
different in the two countries. Turkey’s per capita usage of the Internet is
over six times greater than Pakistan’s. While Turkey is rolling out the
second generation of a national backbone, Pakistan has only recently been
talking about the creation of a national Internet backbone—but has shown
little progress toward implementing it. While Internet access is possible at
reasonable rates from every village in Turkey, access in Pakistan is limited
to major cities. Some Turkish corporations, banks and media in particu-
lar, are strongly embracing and promoting the Internet within the context
of new business models. In Pakistan, such a phenomenon is much less
widespread.
Accounting for the Similarities and Differences
Chapter 5 presented a detailed comparison of many factors, or determi-
nants, that our analytic framework suggests contribute to shaping the
evolution of the Internet within a country. The purpose of this section is
not to repeat that discussion but to highlight what seem to be some of the
most significant factors contributing to the similarities and differences,
and suggest measures that might be taken to promote the Internet in the
future.
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The analysis presented in this study suggests that although many fac-
tors play important roles, three of the most dominant factors shaping the
Internet are the state of the overall economy, the state of the telecommu-
nications infrastructure, and the often complicated triangular relation-
ship between the government, the telecommunications services provider(s),
and the Internet service providers.
Table 38 shows selected parameters reflecting the state of the two
countries’ economies and telecommunications infrastructures.
























The basic state of the economy establishes the fundamental environ-
ment within which Internet growth and activity occurs. It has a powerful
impact on a host of factors shaping the Internet, including the affordability
of services and the availability of resources needed to expand infrastruc-
ture and promote innovative or entrepreneurial Internet-related activity.
While neither country has a stellar economy, Pakistan is much more hin-
dered by its economic troubles than is Turkey. Unfortunately for these
and other countries, “improving the economy” is one of the most neces-
sary, yet difficult, tasks facing any government.
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The Internet in both Turkey and Pakistan has benefited considerably
from substantial expansion of these countries’ telecommunications infra-
structures in the last decade or two. Clearly, however, Turkey’s telecom-
munications infrastructure has far greater scope and penetration than does
Pakistan’s, which partly explains the differences between the two coun-
tries in the geographic dispersion and connectivity infrastructure dimen-
sions.
While these two elements, the economy and the basic telecommuni-
cations infrastructure, set a basic landscape for the Internet, they do not
help us understand why the Internet has “taken off” as it has in these
countries. One of the more interesting aspects of Internet evolution has
been the effect of the relationships between three major groups of players:
the ISPs, the government, and the telecommunications service providers.
Within both Turkey and Pakistan, policy-makers as a whole have been
rather indifferent to the Internet, having more pressing economic and
political issues to deal with. As the Internet has gained prominence world-
wide, however, interest and support among policy-makers has grown. Each
country has a number of policy-makers, some with cabinet level rank,
who have been strong proponents. We have not observed any organized,
significant opposition to the Internet by interest groups within either coun-
try. Opposition that showed some early signs of emerging, such as within
the national security community in Turkey, recognized that it lacked the
resources to control the phenomenon effectively and yielded. Thus, the
balance of interests within the governments has been, on the whole, posi-
tive, which has helped the Internet’s growth.
In both countries a turning point in Internet evolution came when
policy-makers permitted the creation of privately owned Internet service
providers. This event occurred at approximately the same time, 1995–
1996, in both Turkey and Pakistan. Most policy-makers in both countries
cared little about the Internet in these years, but those who did were sup-
portive of the new phenomenon. Pakistan’s government passed the Paki-
stan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, which permitted
the licensing of non-basic services such as email and Internet connectivity
by private firms. In Turkey, the encouragement of the Internet was a bit
more interesting. Here, the government did not pass any special legisla-
tion, but rather “looked the other way” when the creation of private ISPs
seemed to violate the government’s constitutional mandate to be the sole
provider of communications services. The creation of private ISPs intro-
duced a highly competitive, dynamic Internet services market, which has
been one of the major drivers of Internet expansion.
The relationship between the ISPs and the telecommunications ser-
vice providers, on the other hand, is one of the key differences between
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Turkey and Pakistan. While Türk Telekom was somewhat hostile toward
the prospect of ISPs in the early days of the Turkish Internet, by 1996 it
had positioned itself not as a direct competitor but as a provider of infra-
structure that the ISPs would use. Türk Telekom was one of the major
proponents of the creation of TURNET, the first Turkish backbone, to
which all ISPs would connect. This backbone was a strong catalyst for the
development of the ISP market, for it greatly reduced barriers to entry.
Türk Telekom does provide Internet service to end users but is not one of
the more popular ISPs. While Türk Telekom is not as responsive or as
willing to drop prices as ISPs would like, their relationship has been, on
the whole, rather supportive and mutually beneficial.
In contrast, PTCL and the Pakistani ISPs have a much more confron-
tational relationship. PTCL views the ISPs not so much as customers for
high-capacity services but as competitors of its own ISP, PakNet. At the
same time, PTCL has been acutely interested in maintaining its margins
on basic services. It has therefore kept tariffs for both leased and local
service higher than it might, has dropped prices more slowly than Türk
Telekom, and has not had the same drive toward providing universal ser-
vice. Significantly, Pakistan has no counterpart to the regional access codes
that in Turkey provide access to ISPs from anywhere in the country at low
rates.
While both countries’ ISPs must rely on their national telecom pro-
vider for leased lines, PTCL has not provided a national backbone in the
way Türk Telekom has. This difference has had a profound impact on the
two countries’ Internets. While PTCL has made some pronouncements
about the creation of such a backbone, progress is slow and, at the dawn
of the 21st century, late. That PTCL has played a more aggressive role
vis-à-vis the ISPs than has Türk Telekom is not necessarily a bad thing,
however. PTCL has responded to the competition to expand its infra-
structure and bring its own ISP service to a point where it is now consid-
ered one of the better ISPs in the country.
For all the differences, one of the striking similarities is the eagerness
of many citizens to begin using the Internet, once service is available at
reasonable costs. In both countries, hundreds of thousands of people are
drawn to the Internet for socializing and entertainment, in the first place,
and information in the second. Both countries have significant segments
of the population eager to experience and participate in the global com-
munity. Both countries also have large populations of students and ex-
patriates who frequently access the websites of the national and local
newspapers to follow news in the mother country. While expansion of
commercial use of the Internet is somewhat more difficult to assess, growth
is being driven by both push and pull forces.
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The View of the Internet: A “Balance of Tensions”
Like any technology, the Internet has a social context. It has the potential,
some of which has been realized, for ushering in a broad spectrum of social,
political, and economic change, both for good and for ill. Many commenta-
tors write of the Internet’s potential to transcend national boundaries to
advance relationships and understanding between individuals of diverse
backgrounds, beliefs, and nationalities. The Internet has been touted as a
vehicle for expanding the global economy and bringing modernization and
economic expansion to underdeveloped regions. The personal yet global
quality of the network may empower individuals and interest groups and
enable the circumvention of restrictive censorship and social controls of
oppressive governments. Others worry about the Internet’s ability to facili-
tate international information warfare, terrorism, and drug trafficking and
to promote all manner of economic and social crime and unrest.
The perception of whether the impact of the Internet is a benefit or a
threat varies considerably from one individual to another and from one
country to another. If government policy has a significant impact on the
Internet, as we believe it has, then one would expect to see variations in
the rate and extent of absorption of the Internet, depending on whether
the perceived value among policy-makers, the so-called “balance of ten-
sions,”153 is predominantly positive, negative, or equally balanced. While
the perceived value is just one of many determining factors, the experi-
ences of such countries as China, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Finland, etc.
illustrate the range of this determinant and the influence it can have.154
On the surface, Turkey and Pakistan have good reason to be con-
cerned about the Internet. As overwhelmingly Muslim countries, they might
fear the influence of pornography, un-Islamic information, proselytizing
by other religions, and so forth. Each country has serious problems with
terrorism and dissent and could fear the Internet-enabled ability of terror-
ists to organize, propagandize, and otherwise threaten established inter-
ests. The nations could worry about the ability of Greece and India, their
long-standing antagonists, to communicate directly with Turkish and Paki-
stani citizens. The established media and commercial conglomerates in
both countries could also perceive a threat from the Internet as an infor-
mation source that would undermine their traditional influence over pub-
lic opinion.
Such concerns are not unfounded. In chapter 5 we documented some
of the cyber activity of hackers and insurgency groups that could be viewed
as a threat to established Turkish and Pakistani interests.
While there are countries that have taken strong measures to counter
the perceived negative effects and threats of the Internet, Turkey and Paki-
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stan are not among them. In both countries, the positive perceptions of
the Internet as an enabler of economic development and integration have
dominated policy-making in this area. The beneficiaries of Internet growth,
the ISPs and the commercial interests that are gaining from information
dissemination and electronic commerce–related investment and transac-
tions, are increasingly exercising lobbying power to promote support of
the Internet. At this point, the window of opportunity for a concerted
opposition to dramatically curtail the spread of the Internet is closing.
Opportunities for the Future
Much of the growth of the Internet in Turkey and Pakistan is likely to be
driven by demand of individuals and organizations and the efforts of ISPs
to expand the customer base. In both countries the Internet has become
established, having reached a critical mass in which future growth is a
function of time as much as anything.
At the same time, there is more that these governments might do to
promote the Internet and relieve some of the limiting factors to future
growth. Several of these possibilities are listed in Table 39. Some of these
are exceedingly difficult and long-term (e.g., “stabilize the economy,” “im-
prove the educational system”). But others of potentially high impact are
much easier. Among the latter are measures to reduce tariffs for domestic
and international leased and dial-up connections.
Many of the measures listed here are similar, and they span the spec-
trum from very difficult to relatively easy. Spending a sum of money is
easy; bringing about a shift in popular opinion is more difficult. High-
impact measures are those that are likely to have a strong and relatively
quick impact on one or more of the Internet dimensions. Each measure
can also be classified according to whether it is easy or difficult to imple-
ment.
In each country, measures that are likely to have a high impact and
are relatively easy to implement should be given highest priority. These
include:
 • dropping rates for domestic and, in particular, international connec-
tivity;155
 • promoting legislation establishing a proper framework for electronic
commerce; and
 • continued investment in infrastructure.
Somewhat more difficult to implement because of the scope of the
problem or the legislative and political tangles involved will be an expan-
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Table 39. Measures the Turkish and Pakistani Governments
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sion of IT education and the promotion of a competitive environment for
all communications services, including basic ones.
While there are a great many similarities in the kinds of measures
governments of the two countries could take (Table 39), there is consider-
able difference in degree, with Pakistan generally facing the more difficult
task. One major difference, however, is Pakistan’s need to create a na-
tional backbone to support ISPs, a measure Turkey undertook four years
ago.
The future of the Internet in both countries is promising. Growth,
expansion, and increased sophistication will continue. Whether and how
quickly the Internet will reach its potential and keep pace with other coun-
tries, however, depends strongly on measures taken by the governments
and the national telecommunications carriers to remove some of the lim-
iting factors.
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